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Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties
in the Operation of a Joint Venture
by
ZENICHI SHISHIDO*
A joint venture is one of the most important mechanisms by which
enterprises can cooperate with each other and enter new product or geo-
graphic markets, especially in the context of international business. Joint
ventures between U.S. and foreign parent companies, known as "strate-
gic alliances" in trendier circles,' are currently a fast-growing form of
-business venture.
A joint venture creates a synergistic effect: each enterprise in a joint
venture can make up for its partner's deficiencies and the marriage of the
enterprises in a joint venture can create a new entity whose power is
greater than the sum of the powers of the separate enterprises. The for-
mation of a joint venture enables each parent company to gain instant
access to key technology, new markets, distribution systems, cheap pro-
duction methods, or major customers faster and less expensively than if
the corporation attempted a takeover or independent development of
these assets.
2
Because a joint venture may bring together companies with different
interests, management styles and goals, it creates a potential risk that the
parent companies will not be able to cooperate on a practical level as
business partners. 3 Conflicts of interest arising from self-dealing, corpo-
rate opportunities, and disclosure may cause friction between parent
companies.
* Associate Professor of Law, Seikei University, Tokyo, Japan.
I. A recent Business Week cover story listed the following examples of international
joint ventures were listed: a joint venture entered into by Boeing, Mitsubishi, Fuji, and Kawa-
sad to produce small aircraft for the perceived benefits of cutting costs and sharing technol-
ogy; a joint venture between GM and Toyota to produce autos more cheaply; a joint venture
between GTE and Fujitsu to produce communications equipment that aims to obtain new
markets and enhance distribution systems; and a joint venture to produce steel run by U.S.
Steel and Pohang Iron & Steel that seeks to increase existing market shares and raise capital
levels. Levine & Byrne, Corporate Odd Couples, Bus. Wx., July 21, 1986, at 100-01.
2. Id at 101.
3. This is one of the reasons that successful joint ventures are rather rare. Id at 101-05.
Interlocking directors and officers 4 often present a fiduciary duty
problem in joint ventures.5 Individual directors and officers may owe
fiduciary duties6 to both the joint venture and their parent company si-
multaneously. When the interests of the joint venture conflict with the
interests of the parent company, the interlocking directors and officers
are in contradictory fiduciary duty positions. This Essay will discuss
means to resolve the fiduciary duty problem of interlocking directors and
officers and address the fiduciary duty problem of parent companies.
Part I of this Essay introduces the reader to the concept of a joint
venture by comparing the characteristics of a joint venture with those of
a closely held corporation 7 and those of a parent-subsidiary relation.8
This Essay then argues that there is less need to protect the interests of
minority shareholders in a joint venture than there is to protect the inter-
ests of minority shareholders in either a closely held corporation or of a
subsidiary in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Part I also points out that
an analysis of a joint venture is complicated by the multiplicity of distinct
interests involved and the possibility of falling afoul of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.
Part II illustrates how conflict of interest situations may arise in a
joint venture and categorizes these situations into three types: self-deal-
ing conflicts, corporate opportunity conflicts, and disclosure conflicts.
Part II will also provide examples of each type of situation.
Part III first explores the argument that dissenting parent compa-
nies in certain cases should be estopped from undertaking direct action
against a joint venture director for a breach of fiduciary duty by virtue of
an implied agreement among the parent companies that recognizes that
the representatives of each parent company will vote for his parent's in-
terests. The discussion concludes that normally the implied agreement
4. Interlocking directors and officers are directors and officers who sit in two or more
companies at the same time. There are three variations of interlocking directors and officers:
those who sit in a joint venture and a parent company, those who sit in a parent company and
a subsidiary, and those who sit in companies that have no ties with each other.
5. Parent companies are companies that make a substantial investment in a joint venture
and take part in operating it.
6. People who are in fiduciary positions, like directors or officers of corporations, are
under obligation to give the interests of their beneficiaries the highest priority. See generally
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§ 235 (3d ed. 1983) (increasingly statutes are providing that corporate directors and officers
owe a fiduciary duty to their corporation-a duty requiring good faith and fair dealing); Fran-
kel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983) (in a close corporation, the duty owed
between stockholders and directors is analogous to the strict duty owed among partners).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 17-34.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 36-51.
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does not excuse a joint venture director or a parent company from fulfil-
ling fiduciary duties owed to the joint venture and that the implied agree-
ment argument is viable only in limited circumstances.
Section A of part III, on self-dealing conflicts of interest, argues that
ratification by noninterested parent companies is the key to avoiding fi-
duciary duty problems. It recognizes the difficulty of obtaining full and
fair disclosure prior to ratification and suggests that parent companies
agree on the criteria governing such disclosure in advance. Section A
also demonstrates the difficulty faced by courts in applying an arm's-
length standard as a test of the fairness of a self-dealing transaction.
Section B discusses corporate opportunity conflicts of interest, be-
ginning with the observation that the best way for the parent companies
to avoid putting the interlocking directors and officers in contradictory
positions of duty and loyalty is to employ express agreements to define
and limit the scope of corporate opportunities that must be given to the
joint venture. It notes that the antitrust laws prohibiting restraint of com-
petition and the business disadvantages of limiting the joint venture's
ability to maximize potential synergistic benefits prevent the use of ex-
press agreements from providing a complete solution.
Section B also proposes a new approach to resolving fiduciary duty
problems in the corporate opportunity area. This approach, drawing on
analyses of the parent-subsidiary relationship advanced by Harvard
professors Victor Brudney and Robert C. Clark and by the American
Law Institute (ALI), concludes that in a joint venture, absent an express
agreement to the contrary, there should be a presumption favoring the
assignment of corporate opportunities to the interested parents except in
limited circumstances. These analyses are illustrated in a series of matri-
ces (Tables 1-4), with the author's theory illustrated in Table 4.
Section B also discusses other options for dissatisfied parent compa-
nies, such as buy-outs and noncooperation, and suggests that the best
strategy for parent companies is to maximize its own long-term gains
over short-term benefits. The section examines the conflicts of interest
problem presented by the choices a joint venture must make in its divi-
dend policy and regarding its amount of capital. Section B concludes
that these problems are too complicated to be handled under the legal
schemes discussed and must be resolved through an approach that at-
tempts to balance the interests of the parent companies.
Section C of part III, on the disclosure conflict of interests problem,
argues that balancing the interests of a joint venture and a parent, or the
interests of parent companies, is the key to resolving the disclosure con-
flicts. The section discusses three factors which should be used to bal-
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ance competing interests: the characteristics of the information, the
interest of the other parent companies in the information, and the degree
of disclosure. Section C briefly illustrates the relationship between the
fiduciary duty problem and the antitrust problem of collusion using the
example of the General Motors (GM)-Toyota joint venture. It concludes
that full disclosure of all material interests and material facts is not al-
ways necessary to enable a parent company or an interlocking director to
avoid liability; it notes that partial disclosure, or disclosure of generalized
information, might substitute effectively for full disclosure in certain
cases.
I. Nature of a Joint Venture
A. Definition of "Joint Venture"
"Joint venture" is an ambiguous term used to describe many kinds
of enterprises. Under the classic definition, the terms "joint venture" or
"joint adventure" describe any "association created by co-owners of a
business undertaking," differing from a partnership (if at all) in that it
has a more limited scope.9 According to this definition, a joint venture is
a special form of partnership and is no longer a joint venture for legal
purposes once it is incorporated. Some economists, however, define a
joint venture as "formed by two or more separate entities, usually corpo-
rations, which typically allocate ownership based on shares of stock
controlled."10
Another approach, used in the antitrust context, defines "joint ven-
ture" as:
an integration of operations between two or more separate firms, in
which the following conditions are present: (1) the enterprise is under
the joint control of the parent firms, which are not under related con-
trol; (2) each parent makes a substantial contribution to the joint enter-
prise; (3) the enterprise exists as a business entity separate from its
parents; and (4) the joint venture creates significant new enterprise ca-
pability in terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a new
product, or entry into a new market.1 '
This definition focuses on the organization, management, ownership, and
operation of a joint venture, not on whether the enterprise is
incorporated.
This Essay will employ the functional definition of a joint venture:
any form of enterprise in which two or more independent enterprises
9. A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 35 (1968).
10. S. BERG, J. DUNCAN & P. FRIEDMAN, JOINT VENTURE STRATEGIES AND CORPO-
RATE INNOVATION § 3 (1982).
11. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1526 (1982).
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(parent companies) invest and in whose operation all parent companies
participate. 12 Many joint ventures have special agreements among the
participating parent companies to prevent majority shareholding parent
companies from monopolizing the board of directors. This capacity, re-
ferred to in this Essay as the "Principle of Stock Majority," will be dis-
cussed later.
13
There are both joint venture corporations and joint venture partner-
ships. The legal affairs of incorporated joint ventures are governed by
corporation law and the legal affairs of unincorporated joint ventures are
governed by partnership law. 14 The fiduciary duties owed by incorpo-
rated and unincorporated joint ventures, however, are fairly similar. 15
More importantly, because both joint venture forms increasingly govern
their business affairs through the use of prearranged contractual agree-
ments, the management structures and operations of incorporated and
unincorporated joint ventures are converging. Accordingly, this Essay
focuses on joint venture corporations and makes only passing reference
to joint venture partnerships.
B. Comparison of a Joint Venture with a Closely Held Corporation
In a sense, a joint venture is a closely held corporation and has many
similar problems. These similarities make analysis of fiduciary duty
problems in the closely held corporation context applicable to joint ven-
12. See, eg., Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661 (Ist Cir. 1984)
(joint venture for manufacturing a device called an infusion pump; parents were a corporation
which contributed the licensing rights and information relating to the development of that type
of product and a corporation which contributed cash); McCrindle & Son, Ltd. v. Durant, 611
F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1980) (joint venture for shipbuilding and a second joint venture for drilling
set up by a Scottish corporation and an American corporation); Gates Energy Products v.
Yuasa Battery Co., 599 F. Supp. 368 (D.C. Colo. 1983) (joint venture for manufacturing and
marketing sealed rechargeable lead-acid batteries involving an American corporation and Jap-
anese corporation); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 564 P.2d 277 (1977) (joint
venture corporation in the wood products business; parent companies were a local corporation,
which had experience and prospects for timber acquisition in Montana and Canada, and a
nation-wide corporation, which had money, access to financing, and an extensive marketing
network).
For purposes of this Essay, the definition of a joint venture excludes subsidiaries whose
parent companies are not independent of each other, closely held corporations or partnerships
whose equity holders are not enterprises but are instead individuals, and enterprises in which
only one parent company operates the business and the other parent companies are merely
investors.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 25-33.
14. A. BROMBERG, supra note 9, § 35, at 192-95.
15. For a discussion of the theoretical and practical similarities and differences, see Reyn-
olds, Loyalty and the Limited Partnership, 34 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 21 (1985). See also Hillman,
Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MiAMI L. REv. 201, 230-47 (1987).
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tures. A joint venture also has some important distinguishing character-
istics, however, that set it apart from a closely held corporation. This
section will describe the characteristics of a joint venture through a com-
parison of a joint venture and a closely held corporation.
(1) Similarities Between a Closely Held Corporation and a Joint Venture
A closely held corporation is a corporation that has a small number
of stockholders and consequently has no market for its stock,16 making it
very difficult for minority shareholders to liquidate their investments.'
7
For example, in a closely held corporation, it is very difficult for a minor-
ity shareholder to obtain financial benefits from a corporation in propor-
tion to equity held in the corporation. When a majority shareholder
siphons off the profit of the corporation by means of an excessive salary
or an unfair transaction and subsequently depresses the dividends, a mi-
nority shareholder might be forced to remain in the corporation as a dis-
satisfied investor.'
8
This difficulty in liquidating investments is the most important fac-
tor behind the problem of oppression of minority shareholders.' 9 In pub-
licly held corporations, a dissatisfied shareholder can sell his stock in the
corporation; in a closely held corporation the shareholder cannot. Even
if a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation can liquidate in-
vestments by way of, for example, an appraisal remedy20 or buy-out con-
tract,2 I establishing the fair value of the stock is very difficult because
16. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 585-86, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(1975); F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS-ExPULSION OR OP-
PRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES § 1.01, at 2 n.1 (1975).
17. When shareholders of a corporation want to liquidate or recoup their investment,
they must sell their stocks to someone other than the corporation except in some special cases
(e.g., appraisal remedy, see infra note 20). In a closely held corporation, it is very difficult for
shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, to find buyers for their stock.
18. F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, § 2.15, at 42; Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the
Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close
Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982).
19. F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, at 1-2.
20. An appraisal remedy is "essentially a statutory creation to enable shareholders who
object to certain extraordinary corporate matters to dissent and to require the corporation to
buy their shares at the value immediately prior to the approval of the matter or on the day
before the announcement of the proposed matter and thus to withdraw from the Corporation."
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 997; see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 13.02 (1984) (amended 1986); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300 (Deering 1977).
21. Buy-out contracts or buy-out arrangements are "provisions, usually in shareholder
agreements, whereby in the case of deadlock (as well as other contingencies), one faction can
be bought out, thus preserving the corporation as a going concern and assuring a fair price to
those whose interests are bought out." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 736.
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there is no market price.
22
Joint ventures like closely held corporations generally have no mar-
ket for their stocks and thus, minority or equal partners cannot liquidate
their investments easily. Once a shareholder dispute or a deadlock 23 oc-
curs, fair resolution is difficult to obtain. Thus, a joint venture has
problems resolving disputes or deadlocks that are similar to those of a
closely held corporation and that require similar methods for their reso-
lution such as buy-out contracts or methods of valuing stock.24
(2) Distinctions Between a Joint Venture and a Closely Held Corporation
There are two primary distinctions between a joint venture and a
closely held corporation. The first involves a characteristic of both
closely held and publicly held corporations, namely, that a shareholder
who has a majority of stock can control the corporation (the "Principle
of Stock Majority"). 25 The majority shareholder can monopolize all di-
rectors and operate the corporation according to his business judgment.2
6
The Principle of Stock Majority is not always operative in a joint
venture for three reasons. First, in a joint venture, directors are allotted
to parent companies in proportion to their shares by a special agree-
ment.2 7 A parent company that has only a forty-nine percent share of
22. When there is no market price, courts consider many factors including earning value,
dividend value and asset value. There is no established method, however, for valuing the stock
of a closely held corporation. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 1003; F. O'NEAL,
supra note 16, § 2.16, at 45-48.
23. Deadlock occurs when no decision can be made at a shareholder meeting or by a
board of directors because no single parent company has enough voting power to approve a
decision.
24. See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, ch. 8; UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DE-
VELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (UNIDO), MANUAL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
JOINT-VENTURE AGREEMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, ch. 8 (1971) [hereinafter
UNIDO].
25. "TIThe holders of a majority of the shares with voting power control the corpora-
tion." F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, § 1.02, at 3.
26. In contrast, all partners have equal rights in the management of a partnership. UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(e) (1914). Ordinary matters may be decided by a majority of the
partners. Id. § 18(h). Although the concept of majority rule in partnerships is based on one
vote per partner, it may be based on capital accounts or other actors. A. BROMi3ERG, supra
note 9, § 65, at 381-82. By agreement, management may be concentrated in one or more
partners. Id. § 65, at 374.
27. Parent companies use "binding nominations" clauses (for example, "Three Directors
shall be appointed by Parent Company A, three by Parent Company B. In their capacities as
shareholders, Parent Company A and Parent Company B agree that they shall nominate three
and three directors respectively, and that each shall vote for the nominees of the other."), or
"different classes of shares" clauses (for example, "As registered owner of the Class A shares,
Parent Company A shall be entitled to make binding nominations for the appointment of three
directors, and Parent Company B, as registered owner of the Class B shares, shall be entitled to
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the joint venture can account for almost half of the joint venture's direc-
tors. By contrast, although many closely held corporations also have
special agreements, their usage is less prevalent than in joint ventures.2s
Second, the Principle of Stock Majority may not operate because a
minority joint venture parent company, by virtue of an express pre-agree-
ment, generally has a veto power in important decisions.29 Each parent
company may veto any decision that may increase the liability of parent
companies, change the controlling share of parent companies, or change
the purpose of the joint venture.30 Allowing a veto power in everyday
business decisions, however, is not wise because it may cause future dis-
putes or deadlocks. 31 The number of joint ventures which have special
veto agreements is much higher than with closely held corporations.
32
Third, the bargaining leverage of a minority parent company of a
joint venture also affects the operation of the Principle of Stock Majority.
Since a joint venture is a cooperative mechanism, a majority parent com-
pany cannot ignore the minority parents. For example, a minority par-
ent might supply some essential know-how, license, raw material, or
distribution route. Relatively speaking, the minority shareholders of a
joint venture are more sophisticated and have more economic power than
those in a closely held corporation.
33
make binding nominations for the appointment of three directors. Both Parent Company A
and Parent Company B agree to take all steps necessary to secure the appointment of the above
said nominees in accordance with the laws of California, the United States."). UNIDO, supra
note 24, at ch. 3 § 1(4).
28. F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, § 8.01.
29. In partnerships, each partner has a veto on extraordinary matters, Fortugno v. Hud-
son Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207 (1958), matters enumerated by statute,
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(3) (1914), or matters which are in violation of the partnership
agreement. Id. § 18(h). These rights, however, may be varied by agreement. A. BROMBERG,
supra note 9, § 66, at 381-82.
30. UNIDO, supra note 24, at ch. 3 § 1(7).
31. Telephone interview with Frederick C. Rich, attorney with Sullivan & Cromwell,
New York (Sept. 22, 1986). For example, a minority parent company may exercise its veto
when the joint venture is selecting officers, selling important assets of the joint venture, making
loans to a parent company, selecting auditors, liquidating the joint venture, increasing or de-
creasing the authorized capital, selling stock, changing the joint venture agreement, and issu-
ing new stocks.
32. F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, § 8.01. "The hallmark of a joint venture is the great
variety of agreements required to establish it." Bergens, Foreign Ventures-A Legal Anatomy,
26 Bus. LAW. 1527, 1542 (1971).
33. By definition, shareholders in a joint venture are not individuals but instead are enter-
prises that have already been operating some other business. See supra text accompanying
notes 9-15. Therefore, even a minority shareholder has business experience and knowledge, a
business reputation, an established credit line, a clientele, and capital assets. Individual minor-
ity shareholders in a typical closely held corporation, on the other hand, do not usually have
such tangible and intangible business assets.
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The Principle of Stock Majority does not always hold true in a joint
venture because of the three characteristics discussed above. Even if one
parent company owns more than fifty percent of the joint venture's
shares, that parent company is not necessarily guaranteed full control of
the joint venture. Therefore, there is less need to protect the minority
shareholders of a joint venture than there may be for those of a closely
held corporation.
The second distinction between a joint venture and a closely held
corporation is the duplicity of joint ventures' directors' interests. Almost
all the directors of a joint venture are interlocking directors or employees
of one of the parent companies; thus, they have interests not only in the
joint venture but also in one of the parent companies. In contrast, direc-
tors of a closely held corporation usually represent only the corporation.
The directors' interests in the parent company are usually para-
mount to their interests in the joint venture.3 4 A director may represent
parent company interests instead of the joint venture's interests in ac-
cordance with the primary objective of creating the joint venture-to
maximize the interests of parent companies. A problem thus may arise
with joint venture directors in that each has a fiduciary duty not only to
the parent company but also to the joint venture.
C. Comparison of a Joint Venture with a Parent-Subsidiary Relationship
(1) Similarities Between a Joint Venture and a Parent-Subsidiary Relationship
A parent-subsidiary relationship can be defined as a relationship be-
tween two companies in which a single parent company has control of a
subsidiary company. There are two kinds of subsidiaries: (1) a subsidiary
in which the parent company is a solitary shareholder; and (2) a subsidi-
ary that has one parent holding a majority of stock and minority share-
holders. Only in the latter case does the problem of protecting the rights
of minority shareholders arise. The parent company in such cases tends
to use its controlling shares to benefit its own interests regardless of the
interests of the subsidiary.35 The parent company may try to "freeze
out" 36 minority shareholders of the subsidiary or force the subsidiary to
go private.37
34. See Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REv.
997, 1047 (1981).
35. Egashira, Kaisha no Shihai Juzoku Kankei to Juzoku Kaisha Shosu Kabunushi no
Hogo, 96-12 HOGAKU KYoKAI ZAsSI 1542, 1544 (1979).
36. See generally F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS §§ 2:01-2:20, 7:01-7:23 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1987); W. CARY & M. EISEN-
BERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1517-54 (5th ed. 1980).
37. See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 36, at 1556-60.
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There are two primary similarities between a joint venture and a
parent-subsidiary relationship. The first similarity focuses on the need to
protect minority shareholders. Because directors in a subsidiary com-
pany often represent the interests of their parent company, a parent com-
pany may deprive its subsidiary of profits that were earned by the
subsidiary company or corporate opportunities that should have be-
longed to the subsidiary company. Thus, the minority shareholders in a
subsidiary company are in a vulnerable position. When a subsidiary is a
publicly held corporation, the minority shareholders can at least sell
their shares in the open market. The minority shareholders in a closely
held subsidiary company, however, are in a very vulnerable position.
They cannot easily liquidate their investment, and the parent tends to
neglect the interests of the subsidiary.
38
The vulnerability of minority shareholders can also occur in a joint
venture. In reality, however, a minority shareholder in a joint venture is
not as vulnerable as a minority shareholder in a subsidiary. Even a joint
venture minority shareholder is a parent company and a sophisticated
economic actor. The minority shareholder in a joint venture usually has
enough economic power and negotiating leverage to contract in advance
for the protection of its interests as a minority shareholder.
The second similarity between joint ventures and parent-subsidiary
relationships involves the fiduciary duties of parent companies. Thus far
this Essay has mentioned only the fiduciary duties of directors or officers
of a joint venture who also represent their parent companies. The princi-
ples underlying these fiduciary duties also apply to the relationship be-
tween parent companies engaged in a joint venture. The fiduciary duties
owed by the parent companies of the joint venture to other parent com-
panies are similar to the fiduciary duties owed by controlling sharehold-
ers to minority shareholders in a corporation. The fiduciary duty of a
controlling shareholder is widely recognized in case law. 39 The principles
that impose fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders with respect to
38. Id.
39. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 431-32 (Del. Ch.
1968); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-18 (1975);
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass. App. 201, 205-06, 422 N.E.2d 798, 801-03 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1981); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 192-196, 123 N.E. 148
(1919); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. New York & N.R.R., 150 N.Y. 410, 431-35, 44 N.E.
1043, 1049-50 (1896). Henn and Alexander note two different approaches used by courts to
impose fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders. The first is a direct approach, in which
courts impose fiduciary duties because of the influence and control that controlling sharehold-
ers have over minority shareholders. The second is an "interest" approach, in which the
courts impose fiduciary duties on controlling shareholders by analogy to the controlling influ-
ence of officers and directors. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, § 260, at 654.
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minority shareholders apply without modification to parent companies in
parent-subsidiary relationships. 40
Parent companies of a joint venture, unlike other corporate parent
companies, are not necessarily controlling shareholders. In a joint ven-
ture, even a minority-shareholder parent company has a veto power.
Any parent company may control or influence the interests of other par-
ent companies through its veto power. Therefore, a parent company of a
joint venture, to the extent that it has influence on the other parent com-
panies' interests, has a fiduciary duty comparable to that of a partner in a
partnership. 41 But because minority parent companies of a joint venture
are sophisticated economic actors as a matter of course, there is less need
to impose fiduciary duties to protect than there is to protect minority
shareholders of a subsidiary.
The directors or officers of a joint venture or a subsidiary will be in
contradictory positions when the interests of the joint venture or the sub-
sidiary and the interests of their parent companies collide. In practice,
the directors or officers of a joint venture or a subsidiary are likely to give
the interests of their parent companies the higher priority.42 In theory,
however, a director or an officer of a joint venture has a fiduciary duty to
give the interests of the joint venture the higher priority over the conflict-
ing interests of an individual parent company to protect the interests of
the joint venture and minority-shareholder parent companies. Similarly,
a director or officer of a subsidiary in a parent-subsidiary relationship has
a fiduciary duty to give the interests of the subsidiary higher priority than
the conflicting interests of the parent company.
(2) Distinctions
The clearest distinction between a joint venture and a parent-subsid-
iary relationship is the number of parent companies. The multiplicity of
parties and their individual interests involved complicates analysis of
conflicts of interest in a joint venture. Because a joint venture has at least
two parent companies and a subsidiary has only one, by definition a joint
40. See generally Note, Corporate Fiduciary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary
Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964).
41. "Joint adventures, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise contin-
ues, the duty of the finest loyalty." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-64, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
42. There are two motives that drive the directors and officers of a joint venture or a
subsidiary to favor the parent company's interests. First, the directors or officers of a joint
venture or a subsidiary are nominated by their parent companies. They must follow the intent
of their parent companies to maintain their positions as directors or officers. Second, inter-
locking directors or officers "have a greater personal interest in the financial well-being of the
parent company." Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1047.
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venture has more distinct interests than a subsidiary. A joint venture has
at least three distinct interests: those of each of the two parent companies
and those of the joint venture. A subsidiary has only two interests: those
of the parent company and those of the subsidiary.43 Thus, a conflict of
interest analysis of the fiduciary duties of parties involved in a parent-
subsidiary relationship is inadequate to cover the interests involved in a
joint venture.
The antitrust problems which may arise in a joint venture illumi-
nates a second distinction between a joint venture and a parent-subsidi-
ary relationship. The creation of a joint venture has procompetitive
effects because it creates new competitive entrants through its synergistic
effect.44 A joint venture also has some anticompetitive effects, resulting
from the unique characteristics of a joint venture as either a combination
of enterprises45 or a dealing between enterprises,46 which may result in
antitrust violations: (1) market monopolization, 47 (2) loss of potential
competition, 48 (3) market exclusion, 49 (4) collateral or ancillary re-
43. A typical subsidiary may be said to have three interests if one counts separately the
interests of minority shareholders of the subsidiary.
44. Mead, The Competitive Significance of Joint Ventures, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 819,
823-25 (1967).
45. Parent companies do not merge into one entity through the creation of a joint ven-
ture. They do combine some of their power, however, and create a separate new entity. Thus,
creating a joint venture has an effect on market structure in increasing the degree of monopoly.
The degree of the effect depends upon the scale of the joint venture. The antitrust problem of
market structure or monopoly is regulated by § 2 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton
Act. See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 18-149 (1977).
46. At least three entities (two or more parent companies and a joint venture) exist after
the creation of a joint venture; there is only one entity after a merger. When parent companies
and their joint venture deal with each other the antitrust problem of agreement may arise.
This problem of agreement is regulated by § 1 of the Sherman Act. See generally L. SULLI-
VAN, supra note 45, at 150-329.
47. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 45, at 5-58. A joint venture is a combination
of enterprises. Its anticompetitive effect is generally compared to the anticompetitive effect of
a merger. Therefore, like a merger, definitions of relevant market and changes in the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in the relevant market are important. See Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).
48. Co-ownership of a joint venture may partially bind the interests of parent companies
and may diminish potential competition between them. Potential competition between a par-
ent company and a joint venture may also be diminished because the existence of the joint
venture reduces the incentive for each to enter the other's market. Brodley, supra note 11, at
1531.
49. The problem of market exclusion occurs when the product of a joint venture is so
valuable for an industry (bottleneck monopoly) that the joint venture should make it available
to everyone at a reasonable and nondiscriminatory price. Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952); see 1 W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS § 168 (3d ed. 1982); Brodley, supra note 11, at 1532-34.
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straint,50 and (5) collusion between parent companies. 51
In contrast, because there is only one parent company in a typical
parent-subsidiary relationship, there cannot be an antitrust conspiracy or
a collusion between parent companies. Although the reader should be
aware of potential liability, there is only limited discussion of antitrust
violations in this Essay.
D. Summary
The similarities between a joint venture and both a closely held cor-
poration and a parent-subsidiary relationship make much of the analysis
of the fiduciary duty problems in the context of closely held corporations
and parent-subsidiary relationships applicable to joint ventures. As will
become clear in later discussion, however, the standard analysis must be
modified in some important respects when applied to a joint venture be-
cause of the multiplicity of interests present and the potential for anti-
trust violations.
II. Conflicts of Interest Between a Joint Venture
and a Parent Company
There are a number of potential conflict of interest situations in a
joint venture, which arise between a joint venture and a parent company,
and between parent companies. These conflicts can be divided into three
categories: (1) self-dealing confiicts, (2) corporate opportunity conflicts,
and (3) disclosure conflicts. The following discussion will illustrate each
type of conflict in detail.
50. Joint venture agreements, particularly licensing agreements, often include geographi-
cal or customer restraints on the sale of the joint venture's products. UNIDO, supra note 24,
at ch. 52. Joint venture agreements often restrain parent companies that compete with a joint
venture in the joint venture's geographic or product market. Yamaha Motor Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); Brunswick
Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174 (1979). The courts apply a "two-stage" test to collateral or ancillary
restraints. The first stage queries whether the restraint is ancillary to a legitimate business
purpose of the joint venture or whether it is a "naked" restriction. The second question is,
whether the ancillary restraint is necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of the joint venture.
Brodley, supra note 11, at 1543 n.69.
51. Collusion is the most serious antitrust problem of joint ventures. Most directors or
officers of a joint venture are interlocking directors or officers with parent companies or em-
ployees of parent companies. Therefore, parent companies may exchange information about
price or production levels and may make informal uncompetitive agreements with each other.
Ajoint venture may thus be used as a tool of a cartel. The risk of collusion is almost unavoida-
ble when a joint venture is created. Courts have had difficulty deciding what kind of commu-
nication between directors or officers is collusion. Brodley, supra note 11, at 1530.
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A. Self-Dealing Conflicts of Interest
Self-dealing conflicts of interest may occur when a joint venture
transacts with one of its parent companies. 52 The interests of a joint ven-
ture and the interests of the parent company may conflict when a trans-
action is favorable for the joint venture and unfavorable for the parent
company or vice-versa. In such situations, interlocking joint venture di-
rectors or officers may be confronted with incompatible interests.
For example, when a parent company supplies materials to a joint
venture, the interest of the parent company is to sell these materials at
the highest price possible, whereas the interest of the joint venture is to
purchase them at the lowest price possible. If a joint venture purchases
materials from one of its own parent companies at an unreasonably high
price, this transaction conflicts with the fair distribution of the joint ven-
ture's profits between the transacting parent company and the other non-
transacting parent companies.
The joint venture formed by GM and Toyota, New United Motor
Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI), presents an example of a situation that
poses the possibility of a self-dealing conflict. Toyota is the exclusive
supplier of auto parts to be used by the joint venture in the manufacture
of subcompact cars. GM is the exclusive purchaser and distributor of the
finished cars. Toyota may benefit in the long run by charging the joint
venture a high price for auto parts and splitting a resulting smaller profit
on the finished product with GM, while GM may benefit by buying fin-
ished cars at a lower cost than the reasonable wholesale value of the cars.
Both of the parent companies have an interest in the success and profit-
ability of the joint venture that is at odds with each parent's individual
interest in maximizing its profit on transactions conducted directly with
the joint venture.
B. Corporate Opportunity Conflicts of Interest
A corporate opportunity conflict of interest occurs when a joint ven-
ture and one of its parent companies compete for the same business op-
portunity. The interest of a joint venture and the interest of the parent
52. See, e.g., Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 315, 564 P.2d 277, 283
(1977) (rate of simple interest charged a joint venture by a parent company could not be unilat-
erally changed to a compounded interest rate in absence of express agreement). In a partner-
ship, self-dealing without disclosure would be a violation of § 21 (1) of the Uniform Partnership
Act and the partner which obtains secret profit from the transaction "must account to the
partnership for any benefits." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 21(1) (1914); see Reynolds, supra
note 15, at 15-16; A. BROMBERG, supra note 9, § 68, at 390.
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company may conflict if both seek, but only one can take, the business
opportunity.
A corporate opportunity is any business opportunity that must be
offered to the corporation 3 or that may be considered a corporate as-
set.5 4 For purposes of this Essay, a business opportunity is any opportu-
nity a corporation has to make a profit. There are two types of business
opportunities: (1) opportunities to obtain legal rights to possession of tan-
gible property,55 intangible property, 56 and contractual rights; 57 and
(2) opportunities to enter new product or geographic markets. Some-
times one type of business opportunity will lead to another. For exam-
ple, an opportunity to acquire property may lead to an opportunity to
enter into a new market; or a corporation may hear of an opportunity to
penetrate a new market, but must then seek out an opportunity to ac-
quire necessary materials or rights. From the viewpoint of a share-
holder's expectation, the business opportunities that are within the scope
of the business of the joint venture are corporate opportunities. 58
The conflict arises when a business opportunity within the scope of
the joint venture's business is also within the scope of the business of a
parent company.59 The determination of which company, a joint venture
or a parent company, may take the corporate opportunity depends on
two factors: the relationship of the corporate opportunity and the profit-
ability of the opportunity to each company60 and how the corporate op-
53. AMERICAN LAW INSTrrUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.12(b), comment d, at 186 (Tent. Draft No. 5 1986) [hereinafter
ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
54. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 999.
55. See, eg., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939) (involving an oppor-
tunity to take over an enterprise similar to a joint venture).
56. See, eg., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934) (corporation
purchasing stock of another to acquire its patents); Production Mach. Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass.
372, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951) (opportunity to acquire license to manufacture machine); Bailey v.
Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 A. 320 (1937) (opportunity to purchase patents).
57. ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.05(b).
58. Id. at 186.
59. Id. at 186-87. The ALI defines corporate opportunities in the context of relationships
between dominating shareholders and corporations as follows:
[A] corporate opportunity means any opportunity to engage in a business activity
that is held out to shareholders of the corporation as being within the scope of the
business in which the corporation is presently engaged or may be reasonably ex-
pected to engage, and that is neither developed nor received by the dominating share-
holder within the scope and regular course of his own business activities. "A
business activity" includes the acquisition or use of any contract right or other tangi-
ble or intangible property.
ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.12(b).
60. This factor is used by Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1049-55.
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portunity arose.6 1
Although these factors will be examined more closely in part 111,62 it
is useful to note for present purposes that a corporate opportunity may
arise in different ways. It may come to a director or officer of the parent
company as an individual or in his role as a director or officer of the
parent company. In the latter case, he may become aware of the oppor-
tunity through the use of corporate information or property. A corpo-
rate opportunity may also appear to a director or officer of a joint venture
as an individual, or in his role as a director or officer or employee of the
joint venture. In this case, he may become aware of the opportunity
either through the use of the parent company's information or property,
or through the use of the joint venture's information or property.
63
Under the definition of a corporate conflict of interest in this Essay,
the means by which funds are raised to acquire a corporate opportunity
64
are not considered part of the corporate opportunity itself, but are closely
related to the corporate opportunity problem. Solutions to conflict of
interest problems arising between a parent company and a joint venture
in determining dividend policies and capital levels will be discussed in a
later section.
65
A corporate opportunity conflict of interest may occur in a variety
of contexts. One example is an opportunity to obtain a legal right which
will benefit both a joint venture and a parent company. Suppose Parent
Company A, a large electronics company in Japan and Parent Company
B, a growing software company in the United States, create a joint ven-
ture in the United States to manufacture personal computers. If there is
a business opportunity to obtain a controlling share of a small computer
company in the United States, which is in a dangerous financial position
but has valuable know-how and patents, both parent companies as well
as the joint venture may wish to acquire the controlling share. The issue
is whether the directors from the parent companies should be held per-
sonally liable for depriving the joint venture of a corporate opportunity if
61. This factor is used by the ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 56, § 5.12(b)
comment d.
62. See infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text.
63. ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.05 comment b.
64. Funds may be raised for this purpose by, for example, increasing capital, or obtaining
loans. See, e.g., Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 313-14, 564 P.2d 277, 282
(1977) (A common officer between a joint venture and a parent was not authorized to cause the
parent to pay off a loan the joint venture had from a bank without the knowledge or consent of
the joint venture's board, nor was he authorized to execute a demand note to the joint venture
on behalf of the parent in the amount of the payoff. The joint venture had an opportunity to
renew or extend the loan.)
65. See infra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
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the directors allow their parent company to obtain the controlling share
without first offering the opportunity to the joint venture. 66
A joint venture's entrance into a new market provides a second ex-
ample of a corporate opportunity conflict of interest. Assume Parent
Company 4, a large electronics company in the United States, and Par-
ent Company B, a domestic wholesaler in the Philippines, create a joint
venture in the Philippines to manufacture and sell televisions in the Phil-
ippines. A corporate opportunity conflict arises if Parent Company B
proposes to expand the market of the joint venture into Indonesia, and
Parent Company 4 plans to create a subsidiary in Indonesia to manufac-
ture and sell televisions in Indonesia. In the interest of the joint venture,
the directors from Parent Company 4 should approve the proposal to
expand the joint venture into Indonesia. In the interest of Parent Com-
pany .4, however, the directors should oppose the proposal. In fact, the
directors are likely to oppose the proposal to expand the joint venture
into Indonesia because the directors give the interests of Parent Com-
pany A higher priority than the interests of the joint venture. 67 Such a
situation raises the issues of whether the directors from Parent Company
A should be held personally liable for depriving the joint venture of a
corporate opportunity to expand and whether this action by the directors
constitutes a violation of their fiduciary duties to the joint venture.
Disputes over dividend policy, which is closely related to the corpo-
rate opportunity conflict of interest problem, may create a third conflict
of interest problem. For example, Parent Company B, a domestic parent
wants to limit dividends and retain profits for future expansion of the
joint venture. On the other hand, Parent Company A, a foreign parent,
wants to receive high dividends and recoup its investment as soon as
possible. In this example, the interests of the joint venture or Parent
Company B conflict with those of Parent Company A. The decision of
directors from Parent Company A to make the joint venture pay high
dividends raises the issue of the directors' personal liability for violating
66. See Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977) (oil lease); Omohundro v. Mat-
thews, 161 Tex. 367, 341 S.W.2d 401 (1960) (royalty interest); Fitzgerald v. Hull, 150 Tex. 39,
237 S.W.2d 256 (1951) (oil and gas lease). For examples of how this issue arises in parent-
subsidiary relations, see David J. Greene Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch.
1968); Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 72 Misc.2d 814, 339 N.Y.S.2d 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1972). For an example, interlocking directorate situations, see Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del.
Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956).
67. If both parents of the joint venture in this case were domestic, this hypothetical
would become an antitrust problem of market division. See Huffington v. Upchurch, 532
S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1976) (geographic expansion).
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their fiduciary duties by depriving the joint venture of corporate
opportunities.
A fourth corporate opportunity conflict of interest arises when a
joint venture wishes to increase its capital. Using the same facts as the
above example, Parent Company B, a domestic parent, wants to increase
the capital of the joint venture to expand its business. On the other hand,
Parent Company A, a foreign parent, does not want to expand invest-
ment because it is uncertain it will be able to recoup its investment. Con-
sequently, there is a conflict between the aligned interests of the joint
venture and Parent Company B and the interests of Parent Company A.
Again, the issue arises whether the directors from Parent Company A
can be held personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties by de-
priving the joint venture of corporate opportunities if they veto the pro-
posal by Parent Company B to increase the capital of the joint venture.
C. Disclosure Conflicts of Interest
Disclosure conflicts of interest occur when a director or an officer of
a joint venture has information about either the joint venture or a parent
company, or when a parent company has sole access to information that
is necessary for operating the joint venture.68 The interests of a joint ven-
ture conflict with the interests of the parent company because the disclo-
sure of the information may be beneficial to the joint venture and
harmful to the parent company, or vice-versa.
The GM-Toyota joint venture to manufacture and sell subcompact
cars presents an example of a disclosure conflict. Toyota has the know-
how to manufacture subcompact cars and GM has a distribution net-
work. The product of the joint venture, the Nova, is very similar to one
of Toyota's products, the Corolla. When the joint venture determines the
price of the Nova, it is in the best interest of the joint venture that Toyota
disclose information about the costs and the price of Corolla. Disclosure
of the cost and price information of the Corolla, however, is contrary to
Toyota's interests. 69 An issue arises as to whether Toyota's directors can
be held personally liable for violation of their fiduciary duties to the joint
venture for not disclosing information about the Corolla.70
68. Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 314, 564 P.2d 277, 283 (1977) (non-
disclosure of alternative financing opportunities regarding a joint venture's bank loan).
69. This example is based on the 1984 Toyota-GM joint venture in Fremont, California,
also known as NUMMI.
70. This example illustrates the antitrust problem of collusion. This problem will be dis-




There are several alternative solutions to the fiduciary problems in
the operation of joint ventures. Specifically, these alternative solutions
attempt to resolve the conflicts of interest created when a director of a
joint venture favors the interests of the parent company over those the
joint venture.
One possible solution, which modifies the fiduciary duties owed by
directors or officers to the joint venture, argues that dissenting parent
companies in some instances should be estopped from undertaking direct
action against a joint venture director for breach of fiduciary duties.
Under this theory, there may be an implied agreement between parent
companies that allows the representatives of each parent company to
vote for the interests of their parent company without the risk of being
held personally liable for breach of their fiduciary duties to the joint ven-
ture. This theory presupposes that, because a joint venture is created for
the purpose of maximizing the interests of parent companies, each parent
company understands from the start that the directors and officers of a
joint venture will afford the highest priority to their respective parent's
interests. Joint venture parent companies usually contract with each
other orinclude in the articles of incorporation a right to appoint direc-
tors in proportion to their corporate shares and the power to veto impor-
tant corporate decisions.71 The theory assumes that provisions are an
additional indication that each parent company (majority and minority
parent companies alike) participating in a joint venture has impliedly
agreed to a joint venture structure under which each director can be ex-
pected to favor his respective parent company's interest. The theory con-
cludes that dissenting parent companies in a joint venture should be
estopped from seeking to hold directors of a joint venture individually
liable for breaches of fiduciary duty to the joint venture.
72
For several reasons, this theory of implied agreement and estoppel
does not, however, serve as a complete solution to the conflict of interest
problems of interlocking directors and officers in joint ventures. First,
the existence of an implied agreement or recognition among parent com-
panies that certain directors are straw men for the parent companies is
not enough to diminish the fiduciary duty owed by corporate directors
and officers to the joint venture. When a person takes a position as a
71. Even minority parent companies have those rights. See supra text accompanying
notes 29-30.
72. Interview with Professor Saul X. Levmore of University of Virginia School of Law, in
Charlottesville, Virginia (Apr. 14, 1986). See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?-Conflict of In-
terest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 58 (1966).
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director or officer of a joint venture, he owes fiduciary duties both to the
corporation (the joint venture) and to its shareholders (the parent com-
panies participating in the joint venture). The directors still run the risk
of being held liable to the joint venture if they violate their fiduciary du-
ties in the context of conflicts of interest between the joint venture and
their parent company.
Second, the argument is based on the assumption that the directors
and officers in joint ventures will be straw men. In many cases, however,
directors and officers of joint ventures have substantial discretion and
authority to make business decisions independent of their parent
company.
Third, even when interlocking directors or officers can act in the
interest of their parent company without risking personal liability for
breach of their fiduciary duty to the joint venture, each parent company
arguably owes fiduciary duties to the other parent companies.
73
The argument that an implied agreement exists makes sense only
when the directors who have violated their fiduciary duties toward the
joint venture are straw men for their parent company and they can prove
that a complaining parent company knew that they were straw men and
did not expect them to fulfill their fiduciary duties to the joint venture.
In such a case, the complaining parent company should be estopped from
suing the individual directors.
Despite a parent company's fiduciary duty to the other parent com-
panies as the responsible actor for a director's actions, the director owes
fiduciary duties to both the joint venture and other parent companies.
The importance of the director's fiduciary duty may be different in self-
dealing conflicts, corporate opportunity conflicts, and disclosure conflicts
and may also vary depending on the facts of a particular case. The fol-
lowing section will discuss alternative solutions that enable the directors
of a joint venture to avoid contradictory positions and that balance the
contrary interests of parent companies in each scenario discussed in part
11. 74
A. Alternative Solutions to Self-Dealing Conflict of Interest Problems
Self-dealing, a controversial issue in corporation law, has been dis-
cussed in three contexts: (1) when a corporation transacts with one or
more of its directors or transacts with another corporation in which one
73. Cf Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947) (corporation owes
duty to subsidiary's minority shareholder).
74. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
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or more of its directors has a material financial interest;75 (2) when a
corporation transacts with another corporation that has one or more in-
terlocking directors but no controlling relationship between them; and
(3) when a corporation transacts with another corporation that has one
or more interlocking directors and a parent-subsidiary relationship be-
tween them. Most of the analysis of self-dealing in these contexts applies
to a transaction between a joint venture and one of its parent compa-
nies.76 In some important respects, however, a self-dealing transaction in
the context of a joint venture has peculiar characteristics that distinguish
it from self-dealing transactions in other corporate contexts.
A mere conflict of interest is insufficient to find a self-dealing trans-
action voidable.77 The transaction is voidable only when it is unfair.7
Two factors determine the fairness of a self-dealing transaction: (1) full
disclosure to and ratification by independent directors or independent
shareholders; 79 and (2) fairness of the terms of the transaction.
(1) Disclosure and Ratification
The interested directors 0 of a self-dealing transaction are required
to disclose material facts to the board of directors or to the sharehold-
ers.8 ' There are two types of information which can be regarded as mate-
rial: facts regarding the interests of interested directors, and facts
regarding the contract or transaction.8 2 The failure to disclose material
75. See, ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a) (West 1977).
76. See w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 36, at 565-86; H. HENN & J. ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 6, § 238, at 637-44.
77. From the late 1880s through around 1910, a self-dealing transaction was voidable on
the basis of the conflicting interest alone. See cases cited in Marsh, supra note 72, at 36, n.3.
See also R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, at 160 (1986).
78. Murphy v. Washington Am. League Baseball Club, Inc., 324 F.2d 394, 396-97 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976); Johnston v. Green, 35 Del.
Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (1956); Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, 37 Del. Ch. 530, 545-
46, 146 A.2d 602, 611-12 (1958). Cf Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911, 914-15 (Del.
Ch. 1969) (court applies fairness test to a parent's treatment of subsidiary).
79. "Independent directors" and "independent shareholders" are directors and share-
holders who have no personal interest in either a transaction between the corporation and one
or more of its directors or a transaction between the corporation and another corporation
which has one or more interlocking directors. For a discussion of quorum and voting rights,
see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, § 238, at 640.
80. "Interested directors" are directors who transact with the corporation or who are
common directors of another corporation which transacts with the corporation.
81. Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759 (1972); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.,
383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977).
82. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE. § 310(a)(1)(2) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 144 (a); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.31; ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
53, § 5.02, § 5.10.
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facts is in itself evidence of unfairness.8 3
In a self-dealing transaction between a joint venture and one of its
parent companies, disclosure to an independent board of directors is par-
ticularly important to avoid unfair self-dealing because this disclosure
allows the parent companies to monitor each other's conduct. In a joint
venture, even the minority parent companies have bargaining leverage
and the ability to monitor the fairness of transactions.
8 4
In a closely held corporation or a parent-subsidiary relationship, on
the other hand, minority shareholders may lack knowledge of business
and may have little voice in the operation of business. Therefore, even if
full disclosure was made to minority shareholders before the self-dealing
transaction, ratification of a transaction by independent directors or
shareholders is a less reliable means of determining the fairness of a self-
dealing transaction.
85
Some legislative schemes have attempted to substitute ratification
for a fairness test. For example, before it was revised in 1975, section 310
of the California Corporations Code did not require that a self-dealing
transaction be "just and reasonable" when the proper procedures for
shareholder ratification were followed. 86 The revised law requires that a
self-dealing transaction be "just and reasonable" when the transaction is
approved only by the board of directors, 87 or when no proper procedure
for ratification is followed. 88 Under the relevant Delaware statute, the
courts are directed to look to the fairness of a transaction only if there
has been neither disclosure nor valid ratification.89 The courts, however,
have not always interpreted these schemes to allow ratification as a sub-
83. State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 382, 391
P.2d 979, 984 (1964).
84. See supra text accompanying note 33.
85. Some commentators argue that a fairness test is necessary "to protect shareholders
from voiceless submission to potentially harmful interested directors transactions," although
they acknowledge the weaknesses inherent in the fairness test. Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory
Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201, 227 (1977).
86. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3 10(a)(1) (West 1977). For an illustration and discussion of the
California approach to ratification and the fairness test, see Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-
Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 418, 241 P.2d 66 (1952). See also Bulbulia & Pinto, supra
note 85, at 205-16 (under the statute, a self-dealing transaction is neither void nor voidable if
any one of three circumstances occurs).
87. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(2) (West 1977).
88. Id. § 310(a)(3).
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (1983), see Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 85, at 212-
18; see also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 41 (1979) (full disclosure removes the question of




stitute for fairness. In Fliegler v. Lawrence,90 for example, the Delaware
Supreme Court took the position that the defendant's compliance with
disclosure and ratification procedures did not preclude judicial inquiry
into the fairness of the transaction.91
In assessing the fairness of a self-dealing transaction between a joint
venture and one of its parent companies, courts may give more weight to
ratification by "independent directors or shareholders" after "full disclo-
sure" than in a general corporate self-dealing transaction92 because of the
self-protecting abilities of minority parent companies in a joint venture.
Independent directors may include those that represent the interests of
other parent companies in a joint venture that have not participated in a
particular transaction as well as swing-man directors who are not affili-
ated with any of a joint venture's parent companies. They do not repre-
sent the interests of the particular parent company that has transacted
with a joint venture. "Independent shareholders" are parent companies
of a joint venture that do not take part in a transaction between a joint
venture and one of its other parent companies. The method of ratifica-
tion required for a self-dealing transaction between a joint venture and
one of its parent companies is ratification either by independent directors
or by independent shareholders.
Ratification of a self-dealing transaction by the appropriate method
is necessary when a parent company desires to transact with a joint ven-
ture.93 A corporation will be estopped from challenging a self-dealing
transaction if the shareholders unanimously ratified the transaction after
full disclosure. 94 In addition, a shareholder who ratifies the transaction
90. 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
91. Id. at 221-24. In partnerships, almost anything can be provided for in the partnership
agreement. Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880,
277 N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966). If there is disclosure and consent of non-interested partners,
the courts will let the transaction stand. See Ben-Dashan v. Plitt, 58 A.D.2d 244, 247, 396
N.Y.S.2d 542, 545 (1977). In corporation law, on the other hand, the courts may probe the
substantive fairness of the transaction even if the deal has been approved by a majority vote of
disinterested directors. See Robert A. Wachsler, Inc. v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 778 F.2d 547, 551-
52 (10th Cir. 1985); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405,
418-19, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976). See
generally Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 85, at 207-12 (fairness is an overriding requirement in
the California approach). This contrast has been noted by Reynolds, supra note 15, at 22.
92. For purposes of this Essay, a "general self-dealing transaction" is a transaction be-
tween a corporation other than a joint venture, including both a closely held corporation and a
publicly held corporation, and one or more of its directors or another corporation having
common directors.
93. In partnerships, self-dealing transactions may be ratified by express or implied agree-
ment. When there is a "full disclosure of all material facts," implied consent of the partners
could be inferred. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 11, 15.
94. See Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 957 (Del. Ch. 1980). Even in a case of
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after full disclosure will be estopped from bringing a derivative suit. 95 A
joint venture usually has few independent shareholders and, compared to
independent shareholder ratification in a corporation, it is therefore rela-
tively easy to ratify unanimously a self-dealing transaction. Once the
parent company receives unanimous ratification by independent share-
holders or independent directors, it can transact with a joint venture.
96
Some joint venture agreements prohibit transactions between the
joint venture and any parent company unless the other parent companies
unanimously ratify the transaction.9 7 Even with these agreements, how-
ever, the problem of disclosure remains.
The requirement of "full disclosure" is the most difficult problem in
obtaining effective ratification from independent shareholders or direc-
tors. Ideally, full disclosure requires two elements: first, a complete de-
scription of the director's self-dealing interests in the transaction, and
second, a complete description of the conditions of the transaction.9 8 The
former is very clear in the context of a joint venture because each direc-
tor is presumed to represent the interests of his or her respective parent
company. There is a problem, however, in judging the adequacy of the
disclosure of the conditions of a self-dealing transaction.
The purpose of disclosing the conditions of a transaction is to supply
independent directors or independent parent companies with the infor-
mation necessary to determine whether the conditions are fair to the joint
venture. In some cases, it is easy to obtain data because of the conditions
non-unanimous ratification of stockholders, some courts have barred a derivative suit. See,
e.g., Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 72-74, 128 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1955). Courts that
have not barred suits entirely have at least shifted the burden of proof to the complaining
shareholders where there has been ratification by a majority of shareholders. See, e.g., Michel-
son v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 957
(Del. Ch. 1980).
95. Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (1954).
96. In a joint venture, courts need not differentiate between the effect of ratification by
independent shareholders (non-self-dealing parent companies) and ratification by independent
directors (representing the interests of non-self-dealing parent companies) because ratification
by either reflects the interests of the same parent company. The interested parent company,
however, should obtain ratification by independent shareholders (parent companies), rather
than ratification by independent directors, because obtaining shareholders' ratification is not
much more difficult than obtaining directors' ratification in a joint venture. The shareholders'
ratification has more weight than ratification by the directors. For example, § 310(a)(2) of the
California Corporations Code requires that the transaction be "just and reasonable" when it is
ratified by the board, id., but does not require any fairness test when it is ratified by the share-
holders. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(1) (West 1977).
97. Telephone interview with Frederick C. Rich, supra note 31. Such an agreement
would be similar to a veto agreement. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text; see also
F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 36, §§ 9:08-9:12.
98. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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of the transaction. For example, a market price, or a product or service
whose cost is easily calculated, facilitates determining transaction condi-
tions. In other cases, however, it is difficult for independent directors to
obtain transaction data or difficult for the interested directors to disclose
data. This is true when there is no market price or when it is difficult to
calculate the cost of the product or service, particularly when the cost of
certain products or know-how is a corporate secret99 of the parent
company.
If the disclosure of transaction data is incomplete and there is inade-
quate information to determine the fairness of a transaction, the monitor-
ing effect of independent directors or independent parent companies will
be hindered. From the perspective of the interested parent company, it is
not advisable to transact with a joint venture without full disclosure be-
cause there is a possibility that the contract will be voidable by either the
joint venture or by independent parent companies, despite ratification of
the transaction by independent directors or independent parent
companies.
The best solution to the problem of inadequate disclosure is for the
parent companies to agree on a list of mandatory disclosures prior to
creating a joint venture when they anticipate transactions between a joint
venture and a parent company. Most of the transactions between a joint
venture and a parent company can be anticipated because they are usu-
ally programmed into the joint venture project prior to its creation. A
disclosure agreement that is ratified by independent directors or in-
dependent parent companies, combined with ratification of a self-dealing
joint venture transaction, may estop parent companies from challenging
the transaction. In addition, a disclosure agreement and ratification of a
self-dealing transaction may shift the burden of proof from the interested
parent company to the parent companies challenging the fairness of the
transaction.
(2) Fairness Test
The fairness of the terms of a self-dealing transaction between a joint
venture and one of its parent companies is examined by the courts in
three contexts: (1) when the transaction is not ratified; (2) when the
transaction is ratified by a majority of independent directors or by a ma-
99. Conflicts of interest will occur when interlocking directors are required to disclose
corporate secrets of their parent company. The disclosure of such information, including cor-
porate secrets, also may be an antitrust violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976). For a discussion of the disclosure conflict of interest problem, see infra part III, sec-
tion C.
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jority of independent parent companies but disclosure is inadequate;l°°
and (3) when the transaction is ratified by at least a majority of independ-
ent directors or by a majority of independent parent companies after
"full disclosure." The court shifts the burden of proof of fairness from
the interested parent company to the complaining parent company. 101
When a court judges the fairness of the terms of a self-dealing trans-
action, the standard of fairness is an "arm's length bargain."10 2 Even if
there is a market price, it is not always easy to determine whether a self-
dealing transaction is conducted at arm's length for two reasons. First, a
company usually has some reason for selling the same product to differ-
ent customers at different prices including the size of the sale, length or
course of past dealing, sale of other products, or geographical situation.
For example, if the parent company always sells its product at a special
discount of $1,200 to large customers, $1,200 can be considered a special
market price for all large customers. If the joint venture is a large cus-
tomer, it also should be accorded a special discount price. In such a case,
a price of $1,400 to the joint venture would not appear to be a price
resulting from an arm's length transaction. If the parent company has
some reason to charge some special customers $1,200 and charges the
joint venture $1,400,103 and if the range of prices is reasonable, a price of
$1,400 may be considered an arm's length transaction.10 4
A second difficulty in determining whether a transaction was con-
ducted at arm's length arises bacause a market price often requires modi-
fication when applied to a self-dealing transaction between a joint venture
and one of its parent companies that would not be required in a non-self-
dealing transaction. Sometimes a contract in a self-dealing transaction
100. See Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem. Corp., 37 Del. Ch. 552, 146 A.2d 757 (1958).
101. Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419
A.2d 952, 957 (Del. Ch. 1980). It is arguable whether the courts will examine the fairness of
the self-dealing transaction when the transaction was ratified by a majority of independent
directors or by a majority of independent parent companies, if a minority of independent par-
ent company directors bring suit. See ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.02
comment (a), § 5.10 comment (c).
102. The "arm's length bargain" standard asks whether the terms of the transaction
(price, period of payment, time of delivery, storage or transportation service, guarantee) be-
tween a joint venture and one of its parent companies are similar to the terms of a transaction
negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own self-interest. Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
103. For example, even if the joint venture buys almost the same quantity of goods as the
special large customers, the special large customers might be old and established clients or they
might also purchase other products from the parent company which may justify a volume
discount.
104. This hypothetical situation was suggested during interview with Professor Saul X.
Levmore, supra note 72.
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contains different conditions than contracts governing other transactions.
These conditions include differences in the quality of products supplied
by the parent company to a general customers compared to what is sup-
plied to a joint venture customer. There are also differences in the collat-
eral conditions of a contract with an ordinary customer compared to a
joint venture customer-for example, period of payment, period of deliv-
ery, storage or transportation service, and guarantees. The parent com-
pany also might provide a joint venture customer with services or
benefits that are not provided to ordinary customers, such as guarantee
of loans, sending employees, legal or marketing consulting, brand image,
or social credit. These differences in contract terms between ordinary
customers and a joint venture customer are difficult to measure in mone-
tary terms. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to modify a market
price accurately to reflect the true value of products provided by a parent
company to a joint venture customer. 105
If there is no market price or no comparative transaction, it is more
difficult to decide whether a self-dealing transaction has been conducted
at arm's length.106 When there is no market price, the fair price in a self-
dealing transaction could be determined by calculating the cost of the
product or service. Cost plus a reasonable profit107 would be a fair price
or an arm's length price.
In certain circumstances, it is not easy to define the cost of the prod-
uct or service. When a parent company supplies a joint venture with
special intangible assets or special services, 108 for example, there often is
no standard by which to calculate these costs. A similar situation occurs
when a parent company is the joint venture's exclusive supplier of certain
products; the costs of these special products may be corporate secrets of
the parent company and may be difficult to disclose.10 9
There is an important distinction between a self-dealing transaction
in a joint venture and a self-dealing transaction in a parent-subsidiary
relationship. In the latter, "the parent company will wish to operate the
105. This difficult situation in modifying a market price to a joint venture customer is
almost the same as a self-dealing transaction between a subsidiary and its parent company.
Egashira, supra note 35, at 97-2-181.
106. There are many different factors which must be considered depending upon the trans-
action including loans, sale of property, and service contracts. Note, The Fairness Test of
Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors, 61 HARv. L. REv. 335, 337-39 (1948).
107. An "unreasonable" profit might even be fair under certain circumstances, for exam-
ple, in the sale of rare real property.
108. See Note, supra note 106, at 339.
109. The disclosure of the costs of special products contributes to or creates the antitrust
problems of collusion or cartel. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See
infra text accompanying notes 215-21.
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subsidiary for the benefit of the group as a whole and not necessarily for
the benefit of that particular subsidiary."'110 In a joint venture, because
there are at least two parent companies, one parent company will be pre-
vented from operating a joint venture for its own benefit and from disre-
garding benefits to the other parent companies because each parent
company has monitoring power.
Considering the difficulty of applying an arm's length standard, the
fairness of a self-dealing transaction between a subsidiary and a parent
company may be judged on whether it is a "reasonable profit split" in the
group or not.11 In the case of a transaction between a joint venture and a
parent company, of course, the reasonable profit split standard cannot be
applied.
(3) Summary
The solution to the problem of self-dealing conflicts of interest in a
joint venture is theoretically simple, using an "arm's length transaction"
standard to assess the fairness of the transaction. Although interlocking
directors represent the interests of their respective parent companies,
they cannot make a disadvantageous transaction for the joint venture in
order to benefit their parent company. If the transaction between a joint
venture and one of its parent companies is unfair to the joint venture
from a standard of an arm's length transaction, it is voidable by a joint
venture.
In reality, however, applying an arm's length standard to specific
joint venture transactions is often very difficult. Therefore, the best way
to solve the self-dealing conflict of interest in a joint venture is to enhance
the ability of parent companies to utilize their monitoring mechanism
more efficiently and to encourage ratification of self-dealing transactions
whenever possible. To accomplish this, disclosure of material facts is in-
dispensable. Disclosure may not always be easy to make and presents
another conflict of interest problem, which will be discussed in section
C.112
110. Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 112, 460 P.2d 464, 474, 81 Cal. Rptr.
592, 602 (1969) (quoting GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAWS, 261 (2d
ed. 1957)). See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION § 309 (1976).
111. Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 78 F. Supp. 312, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see Egashira,
supra note 36, at 97-9-1256, 98-10-45, 98-3-328, 98-10-1269; Bonnano, The Protection of Mi-
nority Shareholders in a Konzern Under German and United States Law, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J.
151, 157 (1977).
112. See infra notes 192-209 and accompanying text.
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B. Alternative Solutions to Corporate Opportunity Conflicts
of Interest Problems
In practice, corporate opportunity problems in joint ventures are not
as serious as those in typical corporations because most of the problems
are solved by contracts.1 13 Theoretically, however, corporate opportunity
conflicts of interest are the most difficult problems to resolve. In the con-
text of self-dealing conflicts of interest, despite a disclosure problem, di-
rectors or officers in a joint venture only need ratification by independent
directors or independent shareholders to ensure an enforceable con-
tract.114 In the context of corporate opportunity conflicts of interest,
however, interlocking directors or officers in a joint venture appear to
violate either their fiduciary duty to the joint venture or to their parent
company because they appear to be required to choose between two alter-
natives: either to give higher priority to the interests of the joint venture
or to give higher priority to the interests of their parent company. A
parent company which obtains a joint venture's corporate opportunity
will be liable for violating its fiduciary duty. 15 This section proposes so-
lutions to the contradictory positions of directors or officers in a joint
venture and seeks to resolve the problems of corporate opportunity con-
flicts of interest.
(1) Express Agreements
The best resolution to the corporate opportunity conflicts of interest
is to create express agreements prior to creating a joint venture. Parent
companies can define or narrow the scope of the joint venture's corporate
opportunities in such agreements. 116 There are two kinds of corporate
opportunities: opportunities to obtain business assets, and opportunities
to enter new markets, such as product or geographic markets.' 17 Parent
113. Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex. 1977); see also Huffington v.
Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 578-79 (Tex. 1976) (under partnership agreement terms, partner
held under fiduciary duty to offer opportunity to partnership before taking advantage of oppor-
tunity personally).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 92-96.
115. For analysis of this issue in the partnership context, see UNIF. PARTNERSHIPS AcT
§ 21(1) (1914); Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J. 251, 261-63, 113 A.2d 679, 684, 684-85 (1955);
Fouchek v. Janicek, 190 Or. 251, 274, 225 P.2d 783, 794 (1950).
116. Finnen, Imposition of a Constructive Trust Based upon Breach of a Fiduciary Duty in
Joint Venture Situations, 21 S. TEx. L.J. 229, 236 (1981).
117. A "product market" is a market which is defined by kinds of products, for example,
radio, television, or electrical appliances. "Geographic market" is a market which is defined
by geographic area, for example, San Francisco, California, or the United States. These are the
terms of antitrust law for measuring monopoly power. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 46 at 17,
19; L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION: ANTITRUST 108-19 (6th ed. 1983).
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companies can anticipate corporate opportunity conflicts in the latter
case more often than in the former. For example, when parent compa-
nies create a joint venture in the Philippines, the creation of new geo-
graphical markets in Indonesia or in Singapore will create potential
geographical conflicts of interests. Product market conflicts may occur
when the parent companies of a joint venture that produces radios allow
the joint venture to create new product markets by producing tape re-
corders or televisions. To avoid market conflicts of interest, 18 parent
companies can define their product and geographic markets in an express
agreement prior to creating a joint venture. Anticipating corporate op-
portunity conflicts in the "obtaining business assets" cases, however, is
more difficult because these opportunities generally arise in the daily
business affairs of the parent, and each opportunity has unique
characteristics.
Some joint venture agreements allow parent companies to compete
for any business opportunities with the joint venture. 19 In this way, par-
ent companies narrow the scope of the joint venture's corporate opportu-
nities and eliminate potential fiduciary duty problems. 120
Two problems arise with these express agreements. First, an agree-
ment which restricts the scope of a joint venture's business may create an
antitrust problem by restraining competition. The product and geo-
graphic markets defined by express agreements may restrain competition
by permitting the parent companies to exclude a joint venture from their
markets or vice-versa. Furthermore, when a joint venture and its parent
companies divide a market horizontally by product 121 or geography,' 22
an effective monopoly power may be created in each submarket.
Although there may be business justifications for these divisions, hori-
zontal market divisions are illegal per se under the antitrust laws.123
Agreements which allow parent companies to compete with the
joint venture for all business opportunities may have the same anti-com-
118. See, e.g., Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Tex. 1976).
119. Telephone interview with Frederick C. Rich, supra note 31.
120. Contrast this with the case of typical parent-subsidiary, in which the minority share-
holders have no equivalent opportunity to gain the protection of such an agreement.
121. For example, horizontal product market division will occur when the product of the
joint venture is restricted to tape recorders and a parent company makes televisions but does
not make tape recorders.
122. For example, horizontal geographic market division will occur when the joint venture
sells electrical appliances only in California and Washington and a parent company sells elec-
trical appliances on a nationwide basis but does not sell in the two states.
123. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-612 (1972) (horizontal geo-
graphic market division held to be per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act); L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 45, at 79-82; L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRST, supra note 117, at 425-37.
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petitive effect as market divisions. Under these agreements, a parent
company can obtain business opportunities in which a joint venture is
interested without fiduciary duty problems. Although a parent company
may not always obtain a new market in which a joint venture also is
interested, a parent company can easily restrict the joint venture's mar-
ket with these agreements and vetoes.
The necessity of balancing the interests of parent companies poses a
second problem with express agreements. Although express agreements
can eliminate fiduciary duty problems of interlocking directors or officers
and parent companies, parent companies have to balance interests among
themselves to maximize the efficiency of a joint venture and the interests
of the parent companies.
(2) Balancing the Corporate Opportunity Interests of Parent Companies
When there is no express agreement adequate to resolve a particular
corporate opportunity conflict of interest situation, directors of a joint
venture and a parent company must balance the interests of the joint
venture and the interested parent company in determining who should
obtain the corporate opportunity. A balancing of interests of the joint
venture and the parent company is also necessary, when, although there
is an express agreement, it avoids the legal fiduciary duty problem in
corporate opportunity conflicts of interest but ignores the goal of maxi-
mizing the synergistic advantages obtainable from the joint venture.
In addition to liability for breach of its fiduciary duty, a parent com-
pany may suffer some disadvantages when it gives priority to its own
interests over the interests of a joint venture in a context of a corporate
opportunity conflict of interest. There is a limit to which a parent com-
pany can favor its own interests over those of a joint venture without
provoking a response from the parent companies. Dissatisfied joint ven-
ture parent companies can be expected to respond in one of three ways:
(1) suing the biased parent company 24 for damages or for the remedial
creation of a constructive trust 125 to compensate an injured parent com-
pany; (2) suing for dissolution of the joint venture or offering to sell their
shares in the joint venture because of oppression by the biased parent
company; and (3) not suing, but expressing dissatisfaction by not cooper-
ating with the biased parent company in operating the joint venture.
124. For purposes of this Essay, a "biased" parent company is one which obtains a busi-
ness opportunity in which a joint venture is also interested. Contrast "biased" with an "inter-
ested" parent company, in which the interest is present, but the opportunity is not yet
obtained.
125. See generally Finnen, supra note 116.
November 1987] JOINT VENTURE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(3) Responses of Dissatisfied Parent Companies
a. Seek Compensation for Damages
The most radical option for parent companies participating in a
joint venture is to sue for damages suffered or for the remedial creation of
a constructive trust when one of the parent companies takes a corporate
opportunity from the joint venture. The criteria for determining when a
corporate opportunity conflict of interest becomes a legal problem is
whether the business opportunity obtained by the parent company
clearly belonged to the joint venture. It is often unclear, however, which
business opportunities belong to a joint venture.
The discussion of when an opportunity clearly belongs to a joint
venture assumes there is no express agreement between the parents and
the joint venture to narrow or define the scope of the joint venture's cor-
porate opportunities. The courts generally apply one of three tests to
determine when a business opportunity belongs to a corporation: (1) the
interest or expectancy test, 126 (2) the line of business test, 127 and (3) the
fairness test. 128 These tests sometimes overlap in practice. 129 The courts
126. The interest or expectancy test is a standard based on "whether the corporation has a
'beach-head' growing out of a preexisting relationship." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 6, § 237, at 633. "This interest or expectancy has not been defined by the courts, but it
appears to mean a legitimate desire for the opportunity, coupled with some probability of its
realization." Note, A Survey of Corporate Opportunity, 45 GEO. L.J. 99, 100 (1956). Abbott
Redmont Thinlite Corp. v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1973); Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.S.2d 667, 686 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Blaustein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Transp. Co., 293 N.Y.
281, 300, 56 N.E.2d 705, 713-14 (Ct. App. 1944). Some commentators criticized this test as
vague and unhelpful. See, e.g., Walker, Legal Handles Used to Open or Close the Corporate
Opportunity Door, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 608, 612-13 (1961).
127. The line-of-business test is a standard based on "whether activity is closely associated
with the existing or prospective activities of the corporation." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 6, § 237, at 633; Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Lutherland,
Inc. v. Dahlen, 357 Pa. 143, 151, 53 A.2d 143, 147 (1947); Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74
HARV. L. REV. 765, 768-69 (1961). A commentator points out that "only a very few cases
have expressly adopted the 'line of business test.' " Walker, supra note 126, at 627.
128. The fairness test was "ethical standards of what is fair and equitable under the cir-
cumstances." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, § 237, at 634; see also Durfee v.
Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 199, 80 N.E.2d 522, 529 (1948) (corporate directors
and officers may not use their position to further their private interests; the true basis of the
doctrine rests fundamentally on the unfairness in the particular circumstances of the director);
Rosenblum v. Judson Eng., Corp., 99 N.H. 267, 273, 109 A.2d 558, 563 (1954) (business
opportunity that belongs to the corporation establishes duty upon officers and directors to
acquire it for the corporation, not for themselves; bad faith is not essential in the particular
circumstances of a director).
129. Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 224, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (1974); Note, Corporate
Opportunity - Miller v. Miller - Proper Application of the Fairness Doctrine in the Corporate
Opportunity Area, 2 J. CORP. L. 405 (1977); see also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 36,
at 596 (discussing combination of the "line of business" and the "fairness" tests in Miller).
[Vol. 39
JOINT VENTURE
also allow the defense of corporate incapacity in three contexts: (1) ultra
vires, 130 (2) rejection by the corporation,131 and (3) inability to finance
the opportunity.1 32 These approaches to determining when and to whom
a business opportunity belongs, however, have been criticized as ambigu-
ous and as allowing excessive judicial discretion. 133 Some commentators
indicate that these case law approaches are suitable only for closely held
corporations.
Professors Brudney and Clark insist that the courts should take dif-
ferent approaches when examining the corporate opportunity cases of
closely held corporations and publicly held corporations because of dif-
ferences in the investors' abilities to select and monitor corporate manag-
ers, in the investors' abilities to contract with one another, in the
managers' duties and compensation agreements, and in the size of corpo-
rate opportunities. 34 Brudney and Clark conclude that the current case
law approach is suitable only for closely held corporations.135 They rec-
ommend providing a larger role for shareholder consent in the taking of
corporate opportunities and shifting the burden of proof to the chal-
lenged fiduciary who fails to obtain consent in the case of closely held
corporations. 136
If a joint venture reasonably expects to acquire a business opportu-
nity that a parent company will be unable to acquire, or if a business
130. Diedrick v. Helm, 217 Minn. 483, 495-96, 14 N.W.2d 913, 920 (1944).
131. Abbott Redmont Thinlite Corp. v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1973);
Diedrick, 217 Minn. at 495, 14 N.W.2d at 919 (1944). See generally Note, When Opportunity
Knocks: An Analysis of the Brudney & Clark and ALI Principles of Corporate Governance Pro-
posalsfor Deciding Corporate Opportunity Claims, 28 Col'. PRAc. COMMENTATOR 507 (1987)
(a critique of both traditional and recent approaches to assessing corporate opportunity
claims).
132. Miller, 301 Minn. at 225, 222 N.W.2d at 81 (1974); Schildberg Rock Prod. Co. v.
Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 769, 140 N.W.2d 132, 138 (1966); see also Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298
Or. 662, 667-82, 695 P.2d 906, 910-21 (1985) (recognizing availability of the defense). Contra
Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934) (solvent corporation's directors
cannot take over corporate contract for their own profit because of corporation's financial
inability to perform contract), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 708 (1935); Note, supra note 131, at 515-
17 (discussing the role of financial and legal inability to take advantage of corporate
opportunity).
133. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1001. One commentator has pointed out that
courts impose liability on management only where there are elements of patent unfairness.
Walker, supra note 130, at 627.
134. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1004.
135. Id at 1061; see also R. CLARK, supra note 77, §§ 7.3, 7.9.
136. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1016. For full-time executives of publicly held
corporations, Brudney and Clark recommend a rule forbidding the taking of any active busi-
ness opportunity. For outside directors (part-time executives) of publicly held corporations,
Brudney & Clark recommend a rule forbidding only the taking of opportunities in which the
corporation has independent knowledge. Id at 1061.
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opportunity is within a joint venture's line of business and not within a
parent company's, the opportunity clearly belongs to the joint venture. 
137
A problem arises regarding the allotment of business opportunities be-
tween a joint venture and a parent company in which both have an inter-
est or expectancy, or which are within a joint venture's and a parent
company's line of business.'
38
The same difficult problem of allotting business opportunities occurs
in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Brudney and Clark suggest three ap-
proaches to the allocation of a business opportunity that is within the
lines of business of both a parent company and its subsidiary: (1) the
business judgment rule, (2) the highest value rule, and (3) the sharing
formula. 139 They recommend that "all business opportunities be pre-
137. The assumption that the corporation in whose line of business the opportunity lies
will derive a greater risk-adjusted return from it than other corporations is not always true.
Shreiber & Yoran, Allocation of Corporate Opportunities by Management, 23 WAYNE L. REV.
1355, 1369 (1977). A business opportunity that is within a joint venture's line of business and
not within a parent company's, however, should belong to the joint venture because the expec-
tation of the other parent companies should be protected.
138. In the case of general interlocking directors and officers who hold positions in two or
more corporations which have no controlling relationship among them, they must disclose the
opportunity to both the corporations. See Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV.
765, 771 (1961). In joint ventures, however, such a directive does not make sense because even
if the information is disclosed to both the parent and the joint venture, the parent may not
allow the joint venture to compete for the opportunity on an equal basis.
139. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1050-54. Under the business judgment rule, the
decision as to which company should take a certain business opportunity is made by the direc-
tors or officers who first become aware of the opportunity. Id. at 1054. The highest value rule
allots a business opportunity to the company which can make the largest profit from the op-
portunity. Id. at 1050; Shreiber & Yoran, supra note 137, at 1359. Under the sharing formula,
the parent and subsidiary develop a business opportunity together in a form of a joint venture.
Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1051, 1052; Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corpo-
rate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 325-26 (1974). None of the Brudney and
Clark approaches, taken alone, addresses all of the various corporate opportunity problems.
Brudney and Clark suggest distinguishing three kinds of opportunities which are within the
lines of business of both a parent and a subsidiary: (1) differentially valuable opportunities
("[Opportunities that] may ... result in a greater increase in [the] risk-adjusted return if placed
in one corporation rather than the other."); (2) normal opportunities ("[Opportunities that]
may be equally valuable with either corporation but [that] may offer only a normal expected
return."); and (3) exceptional opportunities ("[Opportunities that] may be equally valuable [t]o
either corporation and [that] may offer an uncommonly superior risk-adjusted return."). Brud-
ney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1049. This classification of opportunities is not only applicable
to general parent-subsidiary relationships but also to joint ventures because the necessity of
allotting business opportunities between two companies is the same. Brudney and Clark also
suggest in the context of a general parent-subsidiary relationship that, "the highest value rule
should apply to differentially valuable opportunities; the business judgment rule should apply
to normal opportunities but could be overcome in cases where a grossly unfair pattern of
allocation is shown; and a sharing formula ... seems appropriate for exceptional opportuni-
ties." Brudney and Clark admit, however, that the difficulty of classifying opportunities ac-
cording to their schemes preclude any practical application of the above formula. Id. at 1054;
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sumed to belong to the subsidiary except when the parent company
clearly proves that the opportunity will have a substantially higher value
for the parent than for the subsidiary."' 140 Brudney and Clark apply this
rule of a "subsidiary's presumed entitlement" after considering three fac-
tors: whether meaningful consent from the public investors in a subsidi-
ary is available to the parent company; 4 1 whether the managers who
have de facto control of the decisions of both parent company and sub-
sidiary have "a greater personal interest in the financial well-being of the
parent company"; 142 and whether shareholders of the subsidiary are in
vulnerable positions. 143
Brudney and Clark's rule of a "subsidiary's presumed entitlement"
cannot, however, be applied to a joint venture because the background of
a joint venture is different from that of a parent-subsidiary relationship.
First, in a joint venture, consent among parent companies is very use-
ful. 144 The best way to resolve a corporate opportunity conflict of inter-
est in a joint venture is to make express agreements prior to creating a
joint venture. Obtaining contemporaneous consent from other parent
companies is also useful to a parent company that intends to obtain a
business opportunity in which a joint venture is also interested. 1
45
Second, minority shareholders (minority parent companies) of a
joint venture are not as vulnerable as minority shareholders in a subsidi-
ary. In a joint venture, even a minority parent company has considerable
bargaining leverage.' 46 Therefore, protection of the minority parent
companies of a joint venture is less important than protection of minority
shareholders in a subsidiary.
see also R. CLARK, supra note 77, § 7.8.1, at 257 (arguing that adoption of the classification
scheme would be impractical).
140. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1061.
141. Id. at 1046.
142. Id. at 1047.
143. Id. at 1061. Some commentators argue that in parent-subsidiary relationships, busi-
ness opportunities should be allocated "to maximize the combined net present values of all
opportunities." Shreiber & Yoran, supra note 137, at 1359. This argument, however, cannot
be applied directly to situations of a joint venture because of the distinct interest of the joint
venture entity vis-A-vis the parent companies.
144. Because there are only a few shareholders in a joint venture, it is not difficult to
obtain the shareholders' agreement. Additionally, because even a minority shareholder in a
joint venture has bargaining leverage and monitoring ability, it is possible to obtain meaningful
consent from the shareholders.
145. Ratification'by shareholders after full disclosure may estop the shareholders who
joined in the ratification from bringing a later complaint against the interested parent com-
pany. Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, 545, 107 A.2d 240, 244 (1954). Full disclosure,
however, would not excuse the usurpation of the corporate opportunity. Schreiber v. Bryan,
396 A.2d 512, 518 (Del. Ch. 1978).
146. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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Finally, the fact that managers (interlocking directors or officers)
have greater personal interest in the financial well-being of the parent
company 147 is also true in a joint venture context. 148 Therefore, there is
an assumption in a joint venture that interlocking directors or officers
will allot a common business opportunity to a parent company rather
than to a joint venture. Because a joint venture is created to maximize
the interests of the parent companies, however, the heavy burden of
proof imposed on the parent company in a parent-subsidiary relationship
to show that an opportunity will have a substantially higher value for the
parent149 should not be imposed on a joint venture.
In the context of corporate opportunity conflicts between a dominat-
ing shareholder and a corporation, usually a parent and a subsidiary, the
ALI also applies a two-step test:150 first, an examination of how the busi-
ness opportunity arose, and, second, an analysis which is similar to the
expectancy test.151 If a business opportunity arose as the parent's oppor-
tunity, that is, if it was developed or received by a parent, it is not the
subsidiary's corporate opportunity.15 2 If it was "neither developed nor
received by" a parent and it is "held out to shareholders of the [subsidi-
ary] as being within the scope of the business in which the [subsidiary] is
presently engaged or may be reasonably expected to engage,"1 53 it is the
subsidiary's corporate opportunity. The parent can obtain the subsidi-
ary's corporate opportunity only when to do so is fair to the subsidi-
ary, 1 54 or is authorized or ratified by disinterested shareholders following
disclosure, and the shareholders' action is not equivalent to a waste of
corporate assets.155 The ALI observes:
Section 5.12(b) defines a corporate opportunity more narrowly than
147. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1047.
148. If there is no tie between the companies in which interlocking directors or officers
have their positions, they will be free either to offer to any of their companies any business
opportunities that come to them personally, or to retain the opportunities for themselves. See
Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 489, 121 A.2d 919, 924 (1956).
149. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1055, 1061.
150. ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.12.
151. See supra note 126; Carrad, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in Delaware: Guide
to Corporate Planning and Anticipatory Defensive Measures, 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (1977).
152. ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 56, § 5.12(b), comment d (2)(b).
153. Id. § 5.12(b); see Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978); David J.
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 434-35 (Del. Ch. 1968); Maxwell v. North-
west Indus., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 814, 819-20, 339 N.Y.S.2d 347, 354-55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
154. ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.12(a)(1).
155. "The taking of the opportunity is authorized or ratified by disinterested shareholders
[§ 1. 11], following disclosure concerning the conflict of interest [§ 1.09(a)] and the facts con-
cerning the corporate opportunity [§ 1.09(b)], and the shareholders' action is not equivalent to
a waste of corporate assets [§ 1.34]." ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53,
§ 5.12(a)(2).
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5.05(b), in order to balance the right of the dominating shareholder to
engage in business in competition with the corporation against the
need to assure that the dominating shareholder does not seize for him-
self opportunities that could fairly be said to belong to the
corporation.
156
In order to allot a business opportunity in which both the joint ven-
ture and a parent company are interested, and which is in the line of
business of both companies, 157 two factors should be considered: how the
business opportunity arose, and the relative value of the business oppor-
tunity to the joint venture and the interested parent company.
There are three basic ways in which business opportunities become
known to either a parent company or a joint venture.15 8 First, a business
opportunity may be manifested as the joint venture's opportunity. For
example, a seller clearly may offer a business asset to a director or officer
of the joint venture, the joint venture's directors or officers may discover
the opportunity through the use of the joint venture's information or
properties, or the joint venture may discover it opportunity through ex-
tensive research of potential new product or geographic markets.1 59
Second, a business opportunity may be manifested as the interested
parent company's opportunity. For example, a seller may offer a busi-
ness asset to one of the directors or officers of the interested parent com-
pany, one of the directors or officers of the interested parent company
may come upon an opportunity to obtain a business asset through the use
of the interested parent company's information or properties, or the in-
terested parent company may learn of a business opportunity through its
own research of new markets.
Third, a business opportunity may be manifested ambiguously to the
joint venture or the parent company. For example, a seller may offer a
business opportunity to an interlocking director or officer without speci-
fying to which enterprise the offer is made, an interlocking director or
officer may notice the opportunity to obtain a business asset as an indi-
vidual, 160 or a noninterested parent company may propose to enter a new
market in which neither the joint venture nor the interested parent com-
pany has invested.
Business opportunities also can be divided into three large categories
156. Id. § 5.12 comment at 186.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
158. ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.12(b); see also infra Table 2.
159. See Comment, Corporations: The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunities, 31 CALIF. L.
REV. 188, 189 (1943).
160. See Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 488, 121 A.2d 919, 924 (1956); see also R.
CLARK, supra note 77, § 7.2.5 (some courts distinguish between information obtained in indi-
vidual and official capacities).
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according to their relative values to the joint venture and the interested
parent company. 16  The first type of business opportunity is that which
may yield a greater economic return to the joint venture or have higher
value to the joint venture than to the interested parent company. The
second type of business opportunity is one in which it is not clear
whether the joint venture or the interested parent would reap a higher
return from it. 162 The third type of business opportunity is one which
will yield a greater economic return to the interested parent company
than to the joint venture.
163
The characteristics of business opportunities can be illustrated and
analyzed using a matrix on which the manner in which the business op-
portunity was manifested appears on the horizontal scale and the relative
value of the business opportunity appears on the vertical scale. In the
following discussion, this matrix will be used to illustrate and compare
the theoretical approaches to corporate opportunities in the context of
the parent-subsidiary relationship of Brudney and Clark, the ALI and
my reinterpretation of the two in the context of a joint venture.
Brudney and Clark only consider the relative value of the business
opportunity (the vertical scale) and ignore the factor of the manner of the
business opportunity's manifestation (the horizontal scale). They only
reserve for the parent those business opportunities that have substantially
higher value to the parent than to the subsidiary and allocate all other
business opportunities to the subsidiary. 64 In their analysis, represented
in Table 1, it is irrelevant whether the opportunities were developed or
received by the subsidiary or by the parent.
The ALI framework considers only the factor of how the business
opportunity was manifested (the horizontal scale) and ignores the rela-
tive value of the business opportunity (the vertical scale). The ALI, in-
stead of the relative value of the business opportunity, considers whether
the shareholders of the subsidiary expect the business opportunity to be
within the scope of the subsidiary's business.' 65 This analysis is repre-
sented in the matrix shown in Table 2.
161. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1055, 1061; see also infra Table 1.
162. This type includes what Brudney and Clark refer to as "normal opportunities" and
"exceptional opportunities." Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1049.
163. For example, a business opportunity to obtain uranium ore may yield a greater eco-
nomic return to a parent company than to a mining joint venture because the ore is "wet ore,"
which presents mining difficulties and makes the enterprise hazardous and speculative. In this
case, only the parent company, which has the skill, experience, and financial capability, should
undertake the risk. Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-Continental Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787,
799 (10th Cir. 1960).
164. Brudney & Clark, supra note 34, at 1055, 1061.




Developed or Developed or
Received by Received by
Relative Value the Subsidiary Ambiguous the Parent
Higher Value to
the Subsidiary S S S
Ambiguous S S S
Higher Value to
the Parent P P P
(S = Subsidiary's Corporate Opportunity)
(P = Parent's Corporate Opportunity)
Table 2
Manifestation
Developed or Developed or
Shareholder's Received by Received by
Expectations the Subsidiary Ambiguous the Parent
W/in the Scope of
Subsidiary's Business S S P
Ambiguous P P P
Not w/in Scope of
Subsidiary's Business P P P
Suppose, however, that the analysis focuses only on those cases in
which the business opportunity is within the scope of the business of both
the subsidiary (or a joint venture) and the interested parent company.
Table 2 can then be rewritten as shown below in Table 3.
The factor of how a business opportunity was manifested is a type of
fairness standard. 166 That standard is premised on the notion that all the
parent companies involved in the joint venture ought to be treated
equally. If an interested parent company obtains a business opportunity
that the joint venture originally developed or received, 167 the interested
parent company will receive one hundred percent of the profits to the
exclusion of the other parent companies involved in the joint venture.
166. "Any rule for allocating corporate opportunities can be evaluated according to three
criteria: (1) economic efficiency, (2) fairness to shareholders and (3) ease of enforcement."
Shreiber & Yoran, supra note 141, at 1364.
167. For a corporate opportunity case outside the joint venture context in which the court
found that a corporate opportunity had been appropriated, see Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or.
662, 685, 695 P.2d 906, 920 (1985).
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Table 3
Manifestation
Developed or Developed or
Received by Received by
Relative Value the Subsidiary Ambiguous the Parent
Higher Value to
the Subsidiary S S P
Ambiguous S S P
Higher Value to
the Parent S S P
The result is inequitable in that the non-interested parent companies are
not reaping economic return in proportion to the equity they have in-
vested in the joint venture. Therefore, this fairness standard should be
considered an important factor in determining whether an interested par-
ent company violates a fiduciary duty by obtaining a business
opportunity.
The relative value of the business opportunity is an efficiency stan-
dard. If a business opportunity yields a greater economic return to the
joint venture than to the interested parent company, it may be more effi-
cient for the interested parent company to have the joint venture obtain
the business opportunity than to obtain it itself. This efficiency standard
is a very influential factor from the business point of view, but should be
only of secondary importance in determining whether an interested par-
ent company violates a fiduciary duty by obtaining a business
opportunity.
Because it uses the fairness standard, the ALI framework is more
appropriate than Brudney and Clark's framework for determining the
legal liability of the parent that obtains a business opportunity in which
the subsidiary is also interested. The ALI framework should be modified,
however, before it can be applied to joint ventures.
As a general rule, a parent company can freely obtain a business
opportunity in which a joint venture is also interested. As exceptions to
the general rule, there are some kinds of business opportunities in which
an interested parent company must give the joint venture a right of first
refusal because of the parent company's fiduciary duty to the other par-
ent companies. In this respect, the corporate opportunities of a joint ven-
ture should be more restricted than those of a subsidiary.
There are three reasons for the general rule. First, a joint venture is
an entity which from its inception was created specifically to maximize
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the interests of the parent companies. The purpose of the joint venture is
to serve as a tool of the parent companies. In contrast, subsidiaries that
are not wholly owned by the parent are not always created to maximize
the interests of the parent company. 168 Second, even a minority parent
company in a joint venture is usually a sophisticated business entity, hav-
ing less need for protection than a minority shareholder in a subsidiary.
Third, each parent company is usually allowed by pre-agreement a veto
over the joint venture's chance to obtain a business opportunity. For this
reason, the corporate opportunities of a joint venture are intrinsically re-
stricted. The issue is whether there is some legal restriction on the veto
powers of parent companies when there are conflicts of interest.
The framework for distributing business opportunities that are in
the line of business of both a joint venture and an interested parent com-




Developed or Received by the
Received by the Interested Parent
Relative Value Joint Venture Ambiguous Company
Higher Value to Joint venture Joint Venture P
the Joint Venture (1) (4) (7)
Joint Venture P P
Ambiguous (2) (5) (8)
Higher Value to
the Interested P P P
Parent Company (3) (6) (9)
(Joint Venture = Joint Venture's Corporate Opportunity)
(P = Interested Parent Company's Corporate Opportunity)
The factor of how the business opportunity appeared should be the pri-
mary consideration. If the joint venture developed or received the busi-
ness opportunity, the joint venture gets a right of first refusal 169 (see
boxes (1) and (2) of Table 4). The only exception is when the opportu-
nity will yield a higher return to the interested parent (see box (3), Table
4).
168. Many subsidiaries are not originally subsidiaries but were formerly independent com-
panies. Therefore, there are independent interests of minority shareholders remaining in these
types of subsidiaries.
169. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971); Shreiber & Yoran, supra
note 141, at 1372.
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In all other cases, the interested parent company may take the busi-
ness opportunity without offering it to the joint venture (see boxes (5)-
(9), Table 4), unless the business opportunity will yield a higher return to
the joint venture (see box (4), Table 4). On this point, the joint venture
(in fact, the complaining parent company) has the burden of proving that
the joint venture developed or received the corporate opportunity.
The relative value of the business opportunity should be a supple-
mentary consideration. First, even though the joint venture developed or
received a business opportunity, if the business opportunity has a sub-
stantially higher value to the interested parent company than to the joint
venture, the interested parent should be allowed to obtain the opportu-
nity (see box (3), Table 4). On this point, the interested parent company
has the burden of proof. Second, even though a business opportunity
was not clearly developed nor received by the joint venture, if it clearly
has substantially higher value to the joint venture, the opportunity must
be given to the joint venture (see box (4), Table 4). On these points, the
joint venture (in fact, the complaining parent company) has the burden
of proof.
The interested parent company can clearly obtain the opportunities
in boxes (5), (6), (8), and (9) of Table 4 without yielding a right of first
refusal to the joint venture because, under the general rule, these oppor-
tunities do not involve factors through which the joint venture may as-
sert a notion of prerogative or joint venture right. In these situations, the
joint venture is favored neither by the factor of how the opportunity was
manifested nor the factor of relative value.
The joint venture should be able to obtain opportunities in boxes (1)
and (2) under a right of first refusal as exceptions to the general rule. If
the interested parent company obtains these opportunities, it denies the
non-interested parent companies an opportunity to economic return in
proportion to the equity that they have invested in the joint venture.
The type of business that falls into the category of box (3) presents a
difficult case because it has been developed or received by the joint ven-
ture, but will probably yield higher value to the interested parent com-
pany. For example, a joint venture researches a new market which turns
out to be more profitable for an interested parent company than for the
joint venture. In another case, a joint venture may be offered a chance to
obtain a plant which may yield much higher risk-adjusted return to an
interested parent company. If the interested parent company obtains this
kind of opportunity, it may profit to the detriment of the other parent
companies. It is not necessarily unfair, however, for the interested parent
company to veto the joint venture's chance to obtain an opportunity that
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39
JOINT VENTURE
clearly has higher value for the interested parent company. Moreover, in
this kind of opportunity, the detriment of non-interested parent compa-
nies, if any, will not be significant. Therefore, the interested parent com-
pany can obtain this kind of opportunity without violating a fiduciary
duty.
Business opportunities represented in box (7) are another difficult
case. Box (7) opportunities are developed or received by the parent but
will probably yield higher economic return to the joint venture. From
the business point of view, it may be more efficient for the interested
parent company to have the joint venture obtain the opportunities. From
the legal point of view, the interested parent company has no fiduciary
duty to do so. The joint venture is an entity which was created specifi-
cally to maximize the interest of the parent companies. The interested
parent company cannot be expected to yield a right of first refusal to the
joint venture of the business opportunity which the interested parent
company developed or received.170
The most difficult cases are opportunities represented by box (4). In
box (4) cases, it is unclear whether the joint venture or the parent re-
ceived the opportunity, but clear that the economic return will be higher
for the joint venture. For example, a non-interested parent company
proposes that the joint venture enter into a new market which may yield
a much higher risk-adjusted return to the joint venture than to the inter-
ested parent company, or an interlocking director becomes aware of the
chance to obtain a plant which may yield a higher risk-adjusted return to
the joint venture than to the interested parent company.
The loss to the non-interested parent companies when the interested
parent company obtains the opportunities are much higher than the loss
to the interested parent company when the joint venture obtains the op-
portunities. The loss to the interested parent company may not be signif-
icant relative to its investment when it has the joint venture obtain the
opportunities. Moreover, the interested parent company may reap a
higher return when it has the joint venture obtain the opportunities than
when it obtains the opportunities itself, because it costs less to have the
joint venture take advantage of the opportunity. In contrast, the loss of
the non-interested parent companies by losing hypothetical profit when
the interested parent company takes the opportunities may be significant.
Therefore, the interested parent company has a fiduciary duty to allow
the joint venture to obtain those opportunities. From the practical point
170. See Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1967) (applying interest or expectancy
test).
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of view, this duty will not prevent the interested parent company from
obtaining business opportunities in many cases because the non-inter-
ested parent company must meet a tough burden of proof.
The preceding discussion assumed there was no express agreement
between the parents and the joint venture to narrow and define the scope
of the joint venture's corporate opportunities. Such an agreement, how-
ever, may avoid the legal problem of fiduciary duties involving corporate
opportunity conflicts of interest. Prior to creating a joint venture, parent
companies of the joint venture may waive the right to sue for damages
suffered in the event that the joint venture is deprived of its corporate
opportunity by another parent company. Parent companies of the joint
venture are usually sophisticated business entities and even minority par-
ent companies have negotiating leverage. Moreover, the parent compa-
nies are usually original shareholders of the joint venture. Therefore,
there is no legal obstacle preventing parent companies from abandoning
a limited right to sue prior to creating the joint venture.171
An express agreement, however, cannot solve all problems. In addi-
tion to the antitrust problem discussed previously, 172 problems may arise
when other parent companies are dissatisfied and, consequently, do not
cooperate in operating the joint venture, sue for liquidation, or force a
buy-out.
b. Buy-Outs
When other parent companies are dissatisfied with a particular par-
ent company, which obtained a corporate opportunity in which the joint
venture was also interested, a dispute among parent companies may oc-
cur. The other parent companies may request dissolution of the joint
venture, or that the parent company which obtained the corporate op-
portunity buy out the shares of the dissatisfied parents.1 73 If the parent
171. The ALI's model:
is intended to permit a dominating shareholder to enter into shareholder agreements
that permit him to take specifically defined corporate opportunities for himself, pro-
vided the agreements are entered into by the other shareholders at the time when
they become shareholders. Even in the absence of such an agreement, the dominat-
ing shareholder may insulate the taking of the opportunity from a review other than
waste if rejection of the opportunity is authorized or ratified by disinterested share-
holders under § 5.12(a)(2).
ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.12 comment d at 190.
172. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
173. Usually, joint venture agreements prohibit parent companies from selling shares
without the consent of the other parents. A right of first refusal clause and a buy-sell agree-
ment clause are ordinarily used in joint ventures. UNIDO, supra note 24, at ch. 8 § 1(2)-(4).
For a related discussion on buy-out arrangements, see F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, § 8.03.
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companies agree in advance to liquidation or buy-out proposals, the ob-
ject of creating the joint venture fails because one of the parent compa-
nies may be forced to incur unexpected expenses. On the other hand, if
the parent companies do not agree to liquidation or buy-out proposals in
a joint venture agreement, or if the parent companies cannot resolve a
dispute with these agreements, the dispute can be resolved through con-
ciliation, arbitration or court proceedings. 174
In a closely held corporation, many states175 allow a dissatisfied mi-
nority shareholder to obtain relief through either dissolution or buy-out
only when there is a deadlock and when the interests of the minority
shareholder have been oppressed 176 by a controlling shareholder. Some
states also allow similar relief for a dissatisfied minority shareholder
177
when there is reasonable necessity for the protection of the rights or in-
terests of the complaining shareholder. 178  The courts will determine
whether the acquisition of the corporate opportunity was an act of "op-
pression" or whether it was an act of "reasonable necessity for the pro-
tection" of the parent company. Even if the act of the parent company
does not deprive the joint venture of its corporate opportunity and im-
pose liability for damages on the parent company, it might be a factor in
a suit for dissolution or buy-out. In determining whether dissolution or
buy-out should be allowed, equity courts should balance the interests of
parent companies in a joint venture. It is not necessary that the depriva-
tion of a corporate opportunity which violates the fiduciary duty of the
parent company be the same as the deprivation of the corporate opportu-
nity which becomes a reason for dissolution or buy-out.17
9
174. UNIDO, supra note 24, at ch. 9.
175. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.274 (West Supp. 1987) (deadlock or waste only);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 12.50(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 156B, § 99 (West 1970) (deadlock only); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 450.1823, .1825
(West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104, 1104(a) (MeKinney 1986) (Holders of at
least one-half of all shares may petition for dissolution in case of deadlock. In privately held
corporations, shareholders with at least 20% of outstanding shares may petition for dissolution
on the grounds of the illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions of controlling directors toward
the shareholders.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (Page Supp. 1986) (dissolution on
grounds of deadlock or in cases where dissolution is beneficial to the shareholders); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 2107 (Purdon 1967) (any shareholder may petition for dissolution under certain
circumstances).
176. Oppression is "wrongful conduct by those in control." Hillman, supra note 18, at 39.
177. See, ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1977) (any corporation with 35 or
fewer shareholders); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982).
178. Hillman, supra note 18, at 55-60. In partnerships, each partner has a right to dissolve
the partnership. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31 (1969).
179. When a parent company obtains a business opportunity in which a joint venture is
also interested, the action may not violate fiduciary duty but may be a reason for dissolution or
buy-out. That is, it may cause deadlock and oppress the minority parent companies.
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After an equity court determines that a buy-out is appropriate, the
court must determine the value of the shares of a complaining parent
company. In valuing these shares,180 the court may consider the effect
the usurping parent's act had on the value of the joint venture shares. If
the parent company deprived the joint venture of an interest that right-
fully belonged to the joint venture and consequently lessened the interest
of the other parent companies in the joint venture, this decrease of inter-
est should be added to the value of the shares of the complaining parent
company.
c. Non-Cooperation
The interested parent company has a tactical problem regarding the
degree to which it should insist upon its own interests and the degree to
which it should cooperate with other parent companies to maximize their
total interests. When a parent company obtains access to a corporate
opportunity in which the joint venture is also interested, other parent
companies may express their dissatisfaction by not cooperating in the
operation of the joint venture even if they decide not to take legal action.
If a parent company cannot obtain the cooperation of its partners (other
parent companies), the objectives behind creating a joint venture cannot
be achieved. A parent company may sacrifice its long-term interest in a
joint venture if it obtains a corporate opportunity that offers only short-
term benefit. Consequently, a parent company's best strategy in the con-
text of a corporate opportunity conflict of interests is to maximize its own
long-term interests. The standards embodied in Table 4 may help a par-
ent company determine whether a particular corporate opportunity
would maximize its long-term interests.
(4) Special Problems of Dividends and Increasing Capital
Conflicts of interest between a joint venture and a parent company
may also occur in formulating dividend policy. Basically, a joint venture
has an interest in limiting dividends to facilitate future expansion, and a
parent company has a general interest in receiving higher dividends.
Moreover, the interests of parent companies in dividend policy may also
differ. Some parent companies may want to limit the dividends of a joint
venture to create a long-term profit while other parent companies may
want to recoup their investment as soon as possible. These differing
views of joint venture dividend policy depend upon many factors, includ-
180. On valuation of shares, see generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 36, at
117-36, and Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1453 (1966).
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ing the joint venture's future business prospects, the financial condition
of the parent company, the existence of specific corporate opportunities
for the joint venture or the parent company, and international politics.181
In most disputes regarding the payment of dividends, an issue arises
as to whether low dividends or a restraint of dividends can be blamed for
oppressing minority shareholders.18 2 In both a joint venture and a par-
ent-subsidiary relationship, however, the payment of excessive dividends
may also be an issue. The Delaware Supreme Court established the stan-
dard and burden of proof a parent company must meet when a share-
holder challenges the excessive payment of dividends by a subsidiary in
Sinclair Oil Corporation v. Levien 1 83 In Sinclair, a minority shareholder
of subsidiary brought a derivative action against the parent company to
account for damage sustained by the subsidiary on grounds that the par-
ent company caused the subsidiary to pay excessive dividends,184 which
precluded industrial development of the subsidiary. The Court of Chan-
cery held that the conduct of the parent company must meet the stan-
dard of intrinsic fairness because of its fiduciary duty and its control over
the subsidiary. The Court of Chancery also shifted the burden of proof
to the parent company and held that the parent company did not sustain
its burden of proving that these dividends were intrinsically fair to the
minority shareholder of the subsidiary.
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed and held that the business
judgment standard should have been applied because the intrinsic fair-
ness standard should be applied only when a fiduciary duty is accompa-
nied by self-dealing.1 85 The court observed that the parent company
received nothing from the subsidiary to the exclusion of its minority
shareholders because the minority shareholders received a proportionate
share of the dividends and, as such, the payments of dividends were not
self-dealing. 186 The court also noted that the subsidiary could point to
no opportunity that came to the subsidiary and ruled that there was no
self-dealing because the parent company did not usurp business opportu-
nities belonging to the subsidiary.1 87
181. For example, an international joint venture in a developing country may create un-
certainty for a foreign parent company regarding recoupment of investments.
182. F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, §§ 3.04, 3.05.
183. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
184. The subsidiary's dividends exceeded the subsidiary's earnings but the payments were
made in compliance with a Delaware statute authorizing payment of dividends out of surplus
or net profit. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levin, 280 A.2d at 721.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 721-22.
187. Id. at 722.
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In typical corporations, particularly closely held corporations, ma-
jority shareholders or management seek long-term profit, while minority
shareholders seek short-term profit. There is no conflict of interest be-
tween the directors or officers, who determine dividend policy, and the
corporation because the best interest of the corporation is long-term
profit. In a joint venture or parent-subsidiary relationship such as in Sin-
clair, however, excessive dividends occasionally may be an issue. In a
joint venture or parent subsidiary relationship, the majority parent com-
pany may seek short-term profit and minority shareholders or minority
parent companies may seek long-term profit. Although there may be a
proportional distribution of profit among shareholders and the parent
company receives nothing from the joint venture or the subsidiary to the
exclusion of its minority shareholders, there may be a conflict of interest
between the majority parent company and the joint venture or subsidi-
ary. Therefore, the business judgment rule cannot be applied to the ex-
cessive dividends disputes involving joint ventures or typical parent-
subsidiary relations. The better rule is to apply the business judgment
rule only when there is no conflict of interest between management and
the corporation. 1
88
It is difficult, however, to determine when directors or a majority
parent company will be liable for violation of their fiduciary duties for
making the joint venture pay high dividends and thereby depriving a
joint venture of corporate opportunities. First, it is difficult to correlate
the payment of excessive dividends with the usurpation of a corporate
opportunity. The fiduciary duty of directors or a majority parent com-
pany may be an issue only when a joint venture and a majority parent
company compete for a specific corporate opportunity at the time of the
payment of dividends. Second, courts are very reluctant to overrule a
dividend policy of management or majority shareholders. 189
Creating agreements prior to forming a joint venture is advisable for
adjusting and avoiding a conflict of interest regarding the payment of
188. "If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision .... as the result of
their independent discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than
what they honestly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court will not interfere
with internal management." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, § 242, at 661. There-
fore, the judgment which is influenced by the consideration for the interest of a parent com-
pany cannot be applied by the business judgment rule. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 680-81 (1974); Shreiber & Yoran, supra note
141, at 1357.
189. F. O'NEAL, supra note 16, § 3.05. Even if a dividend policy violates the directors'
fiduciary duty, they still raise as a defense the financial inability of a joint venture to obtain a
certain opportunity. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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dividends. 190 For example, parent companies can formally agree to a
joint venture's payment of dividends at a certain percent of its net annual
profit and to giving every parent company a veto to increase or decrease
the dividends. Dividend policies, however, should be open to modifica-
tion in accordance with the changes of a joint venture's business or busi-
ness environment. Therefore, a rigid agreement regarding the payment
of dividends is not always suitable for operating a joint venture. In this
regard, balancing the interests of parent companies is also important.
The object of creating a joint venture is to maximize the interests of its
parent companies. Therefore, the dividend policy of the joint venture
should maximize the long-term profits (accumulated dividends plus liqui-
dation assets) of its parent companies.
A similar issue arises in considering whether to increase the joint
venture's capital. Sometimes an increase of a joint venture's capital may
be necessary to obtain a certain corporate opportunity. Thus, parent
companies should increase a joint venture's capital at appropriate times
to maximize the long-term returns from a joint venture. In most joint
ventures, however, only parent companies have pre-emptive rights and
each parent company may veto an increase of capital. Therefore, each
parent company must invest more in order to increase a joint venture's
capital. Courts would almost never determine that a parent violated a
fiduciary duty to the joint venture by not agreeing to an increase of the
joint venture's capital or to additional investments in a joint venture.
(5) Summary
A parent company may violate its fiduciary duty when it obtains a
business opportunity that clearly belongs to a joint venture. A business
opportunity clearly belongs to a joint venture when the opportunity is in
the joint venture's line of business or when the opportunity is not in the
parent company's line of business. When the opportunity is in both the
joint venture's and the parent company's lines of business, the factors of
how the business opportunity arose and the relative value of the business
opportunity should be considered in distributing the business opportu-
nity between the joint venture and the parent company.
A good way for avoiding the fiduciary duty problem of the parent
company that obtains a business opportunity in which a joint venture is
also interested is to create an express agreement between parent compa-
nies before creation of the joint venture, thereby restricting the scope of
190. In partnerships, as well, income distribution policy is determined by agreement or by
majority decision as an "ordinary matter connected with the partnership business." UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h) (1914); see A. BROMBERG, supra note 9, § 65, at 366.
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the joint venture's corporate opportunity. This will not, however, resolve
all corporate opportunity conflicts of interest. Even though a parent
company does not violate its fiduciary duty by obtaining a business op-
portunity in which a joint venture is also interested, other parent compa-
nies may be dissatisfied and refuse to cooperate in a joint venture or may
seek liquidation or buy-out of the joint venture. Interlocking directors or
officers should consider balancing the long-term interests of their parent
companies, the result of which depends on the bargaining power or the
fungibility of each parent company.
C. Alternative Solutions to the Disclosure Conflict of Interests Problems
Interlocking directors or officers necessarily have information about
both the joint venture and the parent company. 191 These directors or
officers may be in difficult positions as to whether, and to what extent,
they should disclose certain information. First, interlocking directors or
officers have fiduciary duties to both the joint venture and the parent
company, and the interest of the joint venture and the interest of the
parent company may conflict if the disclosure of information may be ben-
eficial to the joint venture and harmful to the parent company or vice-
versa. Second, disclosure of the information may violate antitrust laws as
a collusion.
This Essay examines four contexts involving the disclosure of infor-
mation about Parent Company A to the joint venture: (1) disclosure of
the information is harmful to Parent Company A, but beneficial to the
joint venture and Parent Company B; (2) disclosure of the information is
harmful to Parent Company A, but beneficial to the joint venture and
neutral (neither beneficial nor harmful) to Parent Company B; (3) disclo-
sure of the information is neutral to Parent Company A, beneficial to the
joint venture, and neutral to Parent Company B; and (4) disclosure of the
information is beneficial to Parent Company A, the joint venture, and
Parent Company B.
In the first and second contexts, there are conflicts of interest be-
tween Parent Company A and the joint venture. The third presents no
conflict of interest and no problem involving disclosure of information.
In the fourth context, although there is no conflict of interest, the disclo-
191. If directors or officers of a joint venture lack information about their parent company,
it will be the parent company's obligation to disclose the information. By comparison, in a
partnership partners have a duty to "render on demand true and full information of all things
affecting the partnership." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 20 (1969). Although the Act provides
the duty of disclosure only on demand, "voluntary disclosure should be considered as neces-
sary both under the Act and at common law." A. BROMBERG, supra note 9, § 67, at 388; see
also Berg v. King-Cola, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 2d 338, 341, 38 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657-58 (1964).
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sure of information may violate antitrust rules governing collusion or
cartels.
(1) Fiduciary Duty Problem
The fiduciary duty problem of interlocking directors or officers oc-
curs in the first two contexts noted above. If the directors or officers seek
to give the interest of the joint venture a higher priority, they should
disclose the information. If they seek to give the interest of their parent
company a higher priority, they should n6t disclose the information. To
solve this problem of conflict of interest, interlocking directors or officers
must balance the interests of the joint venture and their parent using
three factors: (1) the characteristics of the information; (2) whether other
parent companies are interested in the information; and (3) the degree of
disclosure.
a. Characteristics of the Information
There are many kinds of information about a parent company which
benefit a joint venture and harm the parent company. One category is
information which is critical to the competition between the joint venture
and the parent company. This category has significance only when the
joint venture and the parent company compete or, in other words, are in
a horizontal relationship. 192 Information critical to competition may in-
clude information about technology, know-how, design, price, cost, and
output of the parent company's product. Disclosure of this information
may be harmful to the parent company or to the competition between the
joint venture and the parent company. Therefore, interlocking directors
or officers should not disclose this category of information. Further-
more, failure to disclose this information will not be a violation of their
fiduciary duties to the joint venture, and the disclosure of this informa-
tion will constitute a violation of their fiduciary duty to the parent
company.
A second category of the information includes information that is
critical to the transaction between the joint venture and the parent com-
pany. This category is particularly significant when the joint venture and
the parent company are in a vertical relationship. 193 Critical information
includes information about cost or about comparable transactions of a
product which the parent company sells to the joint venture. 194 This
192. See Brodley, supra note 11, at 1552-54.
193. A vertical relationship occurs, for example, when a joint venture or a parent company
is a supplier to the other.
194. For example, if the parent company sells its product not only to the joint venture but
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information is closely related to self-dealing conflicts of interest because
it is indispensable for an effective ratification. 195 When a parent com-
pany transacts with a joint venture, ratification by independent share-
holders (non-self-dealing parent companies) or ratification by
independent directors (who represent the interests of non-self-dealing
parent companies) after a "full disclosure" of material facts is re-
quired. 196 Interlocking directors or officers who have information that is
critical to the transaction between the joint venture and the parent com-
pany should disclose this category of information if they will be liable for
violating their fiduciary duties to the joint venture if they allow the joint
venture to transact with the parent company in unfavorable conditions
without disclosing material facts. 197 In many cases of self-dealing trans-
actions, the harm to the joint venture due to the lack of disclosure of
information is greater than the harm that would result if the parent com-
pany disclosed the information. When a material fact is a corporate se-
cret of the parent company and disclosure of this information would be
harmful to the parent company, however, interlocking directors or of-
ficers need not "fully" disclose the information. In such situations, ques-
tions arise regarding the degree of disclosure. 19"
A third category is information that is related to corporate opportu-
nity conflicts of interest199 has particular significance when the joint ven-
ture and the parent company are in a horizontal relationship. It includes
information about a plan or an intent of the parent company to obtain a
certain business opportunity, and information about how the business
opportunity was manifested and potential profitability if the parent com-
pany obtains the business opportunity.2°° Interlocking directors or of-
also to the nonrelated companies, information about the price or other conditions of the latter
transactions will be critical to the former transaction.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
196. Id.; Talbot v. James, 259 S.C. 73, 190 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1972).
197. The ALI notes that a common director or senior executive does not need to disclose a
conflict of interest or material facts concerning the transaction unless:
(1) the director or senior executive participates personally and substantially in negoti-
ating the transaction for either of the corporations; or (2) the transaction is approved
by the board of either corporation, and a director on that board who is also a director
or senior executive of the other corporation casts a vote that is necessary to approve
the transaction.
ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.07(a). The ALI comments also notes that
"if the director or senior executive is aware of material facts concerning the transaction
[§ 1.09(b)] which could result in harm to the corporation, failure to disclose such facts may
result in a breach of the duty of care ... " Id. § 5.07 comment c at 140. This section, however,
does not take into account the situation of interlocking directors and officers in a joint venture.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 204-09.
199. See supra notes 113-90 and accompanying text.
200. How the business opportunity was manifested and the relative value of the business
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ficers may be liable for violating their fiduciary duties to the joint venture
if they allow the parent company to usurp a corporate opportunity that
clearly belongs to the joint venture by not disclosing the information.
Disclosure of the information about a plan or profitability forecast by the
parent company concerning the corporate opportunity, however, may be
harmful to the parent company and, in many cases, such information
may be a protected corporate secret of the parent company. Interlocking
directors or officers may not be able to disclose such information or, at
least, are restricted in the degree of disclosure.
20 1
b. Other Parent Companies' Interests in the Information
The second factor for balancing the interests of the joint venture and
the parent company is the other parent companies' interests in the infor-
mation. In joint ventures, the disclosure of the information about a par-
ent company to the joint venture is, at the same time, disclosure to other
parent companies because most directors or officers represent one of the
parent companies. When Parent Company A and Parent Company B are
competitors, disclosure of information about Parent Company A will be
beneficial to Parent Company B and harmful to Parent Company A.
Consequently, interlocking directors or officers from Parent Company A
will hesitate to disclose information about their parent company to other
parent companies within a horizontal relationship. When Parent Com-
pany A and Parent Company B are not competitors, disclosure of infor-
mation about Parent Company A will not be beneficial to Parent
Company B and consequently the disclosure of this information will be
less harmful to Parent Company A. Interlocking directors or officers
from Parent Company A not only have to consider the conflicts of inter-
est between the joint venture and their parent company but also need
consider the conflicts of interest among parent companies when deciding
whether to disclose information about this parent company.
Another parent company's interest in information hinders disclo-
sure. Parent company B may be interested in information, because it is
opportunity to both the joint venture and the interested parent company are critical factors for
allotting the business opportunity between the joint venture and the parent company. See
supra text accompanying notes 157-71.
201. According to the ALI comment, a parent company must disclose material facts con-
cerning a business opportunity only when it seeks the approval of disinterested shareholders.
"[T]he dominating shareholder is not obligated to disclose material facts concerning the op-
portunity unless he seeks the approval of disinterested shareholders. If he does seek such
approval, then § 5.12(a)(2) obligates him to disclose material facts known to him concerning
the corporate opportunity." ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, § 5.12 comment
c at 185. Thus, a parent company can obtain a business opportunity in which a joint venture is
also interested without disclosure at its own risk.
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critical to the competition between the joint venture and Parent Com-
pany A and also may be critical to the competition between Parent Com-
pany A and Parent Company B. If, for example, Parent Company B is
interested in information, the harm to Parent Company A from disclo-
sure of information will be much more than the harm from disclosure if
Parent Company B was not interested in the information. Therefore, this
category of information becomes highly protected. If Parent Company B
is interested in information and is a competitor of Parent Company A,
any information which is critical to a transaction between the joint ven-
ture and Parent Company A may be information which is critical to the
competition between Parent Company A and Parent Company B. Thus,
information becomes much more difficult to disclose when the interests
of the parent companies become involved. If Parent Company B is a
competitor of Parent Company A, any information which is related to a
corporate opportunity conflict of interest between the joint venture and
Parent Company A also may be information which is critical to the com-
petition between the parents and this category of information also be-
comes more difficult to disclose. Consequently, it is necessary not only to
balance the interests of the joint venture and Parent Company A, but also
to balance the interests of Parent Company A and Parent Company B
when determining whether a company should disclose information.
c. Degree of Disclosure
Another important factor for balancing the conflicts of interest of
Parent Company A and the joint venture or Parent Company B is the
degree of disclosure. The degrees or stages of disclosure can be roughly
divided into three stages: (1) full disclosure, which discloses every detail
of the material facts; (2) partial disclosure, which discloses only a portion
of the material facts or discloses only outlines and omits details; and
(3) use of information without disclosure, which does not disclose ex-
pressly but merely uses the information for the joint venture.
Full disclosure of every category of information is often difficult to
require, particularly when parent companies are competitors. In some
contexts, however, partial disclosure or use of information without dis-
closure may be substituted for full disclosure to avoid violating fiduciary
duties. Most of the information which is critical to the competition be-
tween a joint venture and its parent company need not be disclosed. In-
terlocking directors or officers, however, can use their knowledge about
their parent company to benefit the interests of the joint venture. Recall
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the GM-Toyota joint venture described previously, 20 2 in which the prod-
uct of the joint venture, the Nova, was very similar to Toyota's product,
the Corolla. Interlocking directors or officers who come from Toyota can
suggest the best retail price for Nova by considering the cost and the
retail price of Corolla.2
03
Interlocking directors or officers may be required to disclose infor-
mation that is critical to a self-dealing transaction between the joint ven-
ture and their parent company.204 Such critical information, however,
often includes corporate secrets of the parent company. 205 Full disclo-
sure of critical information is difficult to achieve, particularly when par-
ent companies are competitors. 20 6 Ratification of a self-dealing
transaction, however, will not be valid without full disclosure.20 7 Partial
disclosure or the use of information without disclosure often may be
enough to avoid liability for unfair self-dealing transactions and violating
fiduciary duties. For example, interlocking directors or officers may be
able to avoid liability by disclosing only rough figures of the cost of the
product which the parent company will sell to the joint venture (e.g.,
under $10,000) or they can negotiate with the parent company not to
charge unfair prices and use their knowledge about the cost while
negotiating.
It is also difficult to require full disclosure of information regarding
corporate opportunity conflicts of interests.20 8 In this context, interlock-
ing directors or officers also may be able to disclose only rough plans
about the parent company's corporate opportunities or they can use in-
formation to negotiate with a parent company not to usurp a corporate
opportunity that belongs to the joint venture.
(2) Antitrust Problems with Disclosure
In a conflict of interest situation, interlocking directors or officers
must balance the interests of the joint venture and their parent company
and must avoid antitrust problems when considering disclosure of infor-
mation. Among the many antitrust problems concerning joint yen-
202. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
203. Using information which is critical to competition without disclosure may create an
antitrust problem because parent companies can use that information to create a cartel. Such
use of information, however, cannot be effectively regulated because it is very difficult to iden-
tify its occurrence.
204. See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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tures, 20 9 collusion is the most critical.210 There are two possibilities:
collusion between a joint venture and a parent company, and collusion
among parent companies. The latter may create a more serious antitrust
problem. When parent companies are competitors, the risk of collusion
through the creation of a joint venture is very high. Both direct collusion
(e.g., regulating each parent company's output) and the exchange of in-
formation by way of cooperation in operating a joint venture will be un-
favorable to competition.211 Consequently, a joint venture may become a
tool of a cartel.
212
If there is collusion between a joint venture and its parent compa-
nies, there is no conflict of interest. By exchanging information which is
critical to the competition between parent companies, 213 parent compa-
nies can artificially set prices or outputs of their products which maxi-
mize their profits. Interlocking directors or officers must refrain from
disclosing information about their parent companies to avoid violating
antitrust laws even when disclosure will benefit all parties, including both
the joint venture and other parent companies.
The GM-Toyota joint venture, NUMMI, is a good example of infor-
mation disclosure conflict of interest and the antitrust problem of collu-
sion in a joint venture.214 The joint venture combines Toyota, the largest
auto manufacturer in Japan, and GM, the largest auto manufacturer in
the United States. GM and Toyota notified the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) of their intention to create the joint venture under the pre-
merger notification provisions of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976.215 The FTC accepted the joint venture con-
sent agreement. 216 Of the many antitrust problems created by this joint
209. Examples of such problems are market monopolization, loss of potential competition,
market exclusion, collateral or ancillary restraint, and collusion between parent companies.
See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text; Brodley supra note 11, at 1530-43.
210. Brodley, supra note 11, at 1530.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, the Rule of Reason, and the General
Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 1239 (1984); Note, Proposed Consent Agree-
ment between General Motors Corporation and Toyota Motor Corporation, 25 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 421 (1984) (discussing consent order allowing the two companies to proceed as they had
planned in an earlier memorandum of understanding); Note, The GM-Toyota Joint Venture:
Legal Cooperation or Illegal Combination in the World Automobile Industry?, 19 TEX. INT'L L.
J. 699 (1984) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission's vote not to challenge the GM-
Toyota joint venture as a violation of United States antitrust laws).
215. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383 (1976). Section 201 of the Act added § 7A to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1982).
216. Statement of Chairman James C. Miller, III, Commissioner George W. Douglas, and
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venture,217 the risk of collusion is the most arguable problem.
NUMMI manufactures only one type of subcompact car, the Nova.
The Nova is similar in design to a car which Toyota produces, the Co-
rolla. GM and Toyota each have a one-half equity share of the joint
venture. Toyota offers its know-how to manufacture subcompact cars
and GM buys all the cars which NUMMI manufactures and sells them
through GM's sales network. When the joint venture-in fact, GM and
Toyota-determines the price of the Nova, it is in the best interest of
NUMMI that Toyota disclose information about the cost and price of
the Corolla, which is a corporate secret of Toyota. The usefulness of this
information to NUMMI places the interlocking directors or officers from
Toyota in contradictory positions, assuming that the disclosure of cost
and price information will be harmful to Toyota. Moreover, even if the
disclosure of information about the cost and price of the Corolla will be
beneficial to NUMMI, GM, and Toyota, because of increased profits
from a resulting cartel, interlocking directors or officers cannot disclose
the information under the terms of the consent agreement.
The consent agreement specifically allows the parties to exchange
information "necessary to accomplish . .. the legitimate purpose or
functioning of any Joint Venture, '218 such as the cost and the price of the
Nova. The consent agreement, however, prohibits the exchange of com-
petitive sensitive information that is not necessary for the operation of
the joint venture,219 such as the cost and the price of the Corollas. One
of the issues of dispute between the majority commissioners of the FTC
and the dissenting commissioners is their differing opinions about the
effect of the consent agreement on restricting collusion between the par-
ent companies.220 The dissenting commissioners were particularly con-
cerned that the use of information without disclosure, which the consent
agreement attempted to prohibit, could not be prohibited effectively.
Commissioner Terry Calvani Concerning proposed GM/Toyota Joint Venture, 48 Fed. Reg.
57,314 (1983), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 48 (1984) [hereinafter Statement of
Majority]; see also 49 Fed. Reg. 18,289 (1984) (final consent decree).
217. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pertschuk, GM/Toyota Joint Venture, 48
Fed. Reg. 57,252 (1983), reprinted in 23 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 56, 58 (1984) [hereinafter
Statement of Pertschuk]; Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Patricia P. Bailey, GM!
Toyota Joint Venture, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,254, 57,255 (1983), reprinted in 23 INT'L. LEGAL
MATERIALS 67, 70 (1984) [hereinafter Statement of Bailey].
218. Federal Trade Commission, General Motors Corp. & Toyota Motor Corp. Proposed
Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,246 (1983), Order
V at 57,247; see also 49 Fed. Reg. 18,289 (1984), Order V at 18,290 (final consent decree).
219. Id. Order IV and V at 57, 247; see also 49 Fed. Reg. at 18,290 (final consent decree).
220. Compare Statement of Majority, supra note 217, at 53-55, with Statement of Pert-
schuk, supra note 218, at 59-63, and Statement of Bailey, supra note 218, at 72-74.
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There are two aspects of collusion in this case: collusion between
Toyota and NUMMI, and collusion between Toyota and GM. 221 The
collusion between Toyota and NUMMI is closely related to the fiduciary
duty problem of disclosure conflict of interests. If there is a disclosure
conflict of interest between Toyota and NUMMI, there may be a prob-
lem of fiduciary duties of Toyota as a parent company or interlocking
directors or officers, but there may be no problem of collusion. In this
respect, moreover, there is a trade-off between collusion and market divi-
sion. If there is an agreement to divide a market between Toyota and
NUMMI and there is no competition between them, the problem of col-
lusion will have less importance. In this case, there is no market division
between Toyota and NUMMI (they are competitors in the market of
subcompact cars in the United States) and the FTC allows Toyota to set
its price on Corollas knowing the price of Novas.
The most serious collusion problem, one with which the FTC is par-
ticularly concerned, is the possibility of collusion between Toyota and
GM by way of NUMMI. In this aspect, there is no fiduciary problem.
Even if there is an agreement to restrict the market of the joint venture,
there is still a risk of collusion between Toyota and GM as competitors.
(3) Summary
Disclosure conflicts of interest are closely related to self-dealing con-
flicts and corporate opportunity conflicts. To resolve the problems cre-
ated by disclosure conflicts of interest, a balancing of the interests of a
joint venture and its parent companies should be required. In balancing
the interests, interlocking directors or officers should consider the char-
acteristics of the information, the interests of other parent companies,
and the degree of disclosure necessary. Moreover, to resolve the
problems created by disclosure conflict of interest, interlocking directors
or officers must also avoid the antitrust problem of collusion.
- Conclusion
Although a joint venture to a closely held corporation and a parent-
subsidiary relationship, the fiduciary duty problem in joint ventures has
unique characteristics. Compared to a closely held corporation and a
parent-subsidiary relationship, there is less need for the judicial and stat-
utory protection of minority shareholders in a joint venture. Further-
221. Interview with Professor Thomas J. Campbell of Stanford Law School in Palo Alto,
California (September 12, 1986).
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more, contractual schemes to preclude these problems are extremely
useful in a joint venture.
For all practical purposes, most problems of conflicts of interest and
fiduciary duty in a joint venture can be remedied through contracts.
Thus parent companies should prevent as many conflicts of interest by
contract prior to creating a joint venture as possible. Contractual
schemes, however, cannot solve all fiduciary duty problems; neither can
they prescribe a regime that uses business considerations to determine, in
all cases, how a conflict of interest should be solved. Initially, there are
disclosure problems which are difficult to draft around in a contract even
if they are foreseeable. Furthermore, contractual schemes cannot ade-
quately address non-legal conflicts of interest that do not involve fiduci-
ary duties.
The conflicts of interest can be divided into three categories: self-
dealing, corporate opportunity, and disclosure. Each category has
unique problems.
There are two approaches to the self-dealing conflicts of interest
problem. If a transaction has not been ratified, the courts should judge
the fairness of a challenged transaction using, where possible, a market
price or arm's length standard. Often, however, market price is not avail-
able for a specific transaction. In that case, a court may attempt to calcu-
late economic fairness based on cost and profit data from the
corporations involved. In both cases, it is difficult for courts to deter-
mine what would have been a fair price.
A superior alternative to judicial imposition of a fairness standard is
the parent companies' use of a full disclosure and ratification process for
all self-dealing transactions. Parent companies should agree on the
meaning of "full disclosure" in the original joint venture agreement.
There are several concepts of "full disclosure," each with different infor-
mational requirements. The parent companies should select and modify
their own version of full disclosure requirements in the original joint ven-
ture agreement. Armed with this definition of full disclosure, a joint ven-
ture can require independent approval of self-dealing transactions by
independent parent companies.
In the case of corporate opportunity conflicts of interest, interlock-
ing directors and officers may find themselves caught between loyalty to
the joint venture and to the parent. They and their parent company must
balance the interests of the joint venture and the interested parent to de-
cide which one should obtain a business opportunity.
A parent company can obtain any business opportunity without vio-
lating its fiduciary duty towards a joint venture except when the opportu-
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nity clearly belongs to the joint venture. Which opportunity belongs to
the joint venture should be analyzed in terms of how a business opportu-
nity arose (a fairness standard) and which enterprise will derive a higher
relative value from a business opportunity (an efficiency standard).
The legal liability of directors and a parent company for a violation
of their fiduciary duties in a corporate opportunity conflict situation can
be avoided by an express agreement that narrows the joint venture's
scope of business. Although the interested parent company can avoid
legal liability, however, dissatisfied parent companies may be able to
force a buy-out or may refuse to cooperate in operating the joint venture.
Therefore, even when there is an express agreement, an interested parent
company needs to balance the interests of all the parent companies.
A disclosure conflict of interest occurs when an interlocking direc-
tor's or officer's disclosure of information benefits a joint venture or one
of the parent companies but harms another of the companies. To resolve
this problem, it is necessary to balance the conflicting interests. In the
balancing process, three factors should be considered: the characteristics
of the information, the other parent companies' interest in the informa-
tion, and the degree of disclosure.
Although disclosure is critical both to self-dealing conflicts and cor-
porate opportunity conflicts, full disclosure may not always be necessary
to avoid the fiduciary duty problem. Partial disclosure or use of the in-
formation without disclosure may suffice.
It is more difficult to preclude disclosure conflicts of interest
problems through express agreements because they are often difficult to
identify and resolve beforehand. Furthermore, the possibility of antitrust
violations for collusion complicate the attempt to draft preclusive
guidelines.
When a court examines a fiduciary duty problem in a joint venture,
a fairness standard is important. The court should consider whether the
interested parent company obtains benefit to the detriment of other par-
ent companies, and whether the conduct of the interested parent com-
pany clearly disappoints the expectations of other parent companies.
Because of the joint venture's special characteristics or contractual
scheme the court should not, however, restrict the conduct of a parent
company of a joint venture to the same extent it would a parent of a
subsidiary or that of a majority shareholder of a closely-held corporation.
When a parent company seeks to resolve a specific conflict of inter-
est, the use of an efficiency standard is also important. The purpose of
creating a joint venture is to maximize the long-term interest of each
parent company through cooperation with other parent companies.
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Therefore, throughout the creation and operating stages of a joint ven-
ture, each parent company should deal with and monitor the others to
maximize its own long-term interests, which may differ from its short-
term interests. A parent company may damage its long-term interests by
pursuing short-term interests in a specific conflict of interests situation.
Only through balancing their long-term interests can parent companies
of a joint venture enjoy the synergistic effects for which the joint venture
was established.

